The Neocons failed strategy in the Middle East. Again. And again.

The author of he following article, The Truth About Sectarianism, Jacob Olidort, is   a Soref fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.  Olidort is impressively educated and is well-connected in Washington, working for both Bushes, Clinton, and Obama.

His article does not distinguish between Saud Wahhabism and Salafi Jihadism as it should.

Th article ignores the $Billions in financial and political support the Saudi and other Gulf dictators have given to Salafi Jihadism is Syria and, for decades, to madrases throughout Central Asia that teach hatred of the West.  Support for Syrian Salafi is one of the main obstacles to a political settlement of the strife in Syria.

Olidort's does not condemn the Saud genocide in Yemen but instead focuses on the death of one cleric, displaying a bias in favor of the Saud and its Western allies.  The US and Britain are complicit in the genocide.


 Olidort does not mention the UN Panel of Experts' report that Abdullah Saleh, former president of Yemen, took as much ass $60 Billion in Yemeni money when he was forced out of the presidency by the Arab Spring.  The money was taken with Saud approval and US complicity, and is now used to fuel the popular rebellion that riggers Saud carpet bombing of the country.  Leaving Saleh with so much money was a mistake.  Starving Yemeni could use $60 Billion.

A more useful article, by  Olidort, published by the Washington Institute, is What is Salafism?, recommended for those of you who are curious.

Per Wikipedia,, the Washington Institute,where Olidort works, has been criticized as "'the fiercest of the enemies of the Arabs and the Muslims'", and describing it as the "'most important Zionist propaganda tool in the United States.'"  The institute vigorously objects.

Olidort does not think is is productive to try to change Saudi Arabia or Iran from a sectarian government.  In stead, he recommends this:

A better allocation of U.S. attention and resources is to deter exploitative acts by institutional sectarians such as Saudi Arabia or Iran. This can only be done by assuming an engaged leadership role in the region—for example, working with local societies in rebuilding their infrastructure so that they do not turn to sectarian alternatives.

Eisenhower build dams to provide water to sectarian Pashtun in Afghanistan.  The Pashtun used the water to grow opium poppies and hate America and Russia with equal fervor.

See where  that got us.

Neoconic advice from its inception.

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 January 25, 2016

THE TRUTH ABOUT SECTARIANISM

Published by the Council on Foreign Relations

Behind the Various Strands of Shia-Sunni Discord

By Jacob Olidort

Sectarian identities were supposedly formed in the Middle East centuries ago, and yet they seem to breed the region’s bloodiest conflicts today. While Iran has thrown its support behind President Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the Houthi rebels in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has strategized on how to bring both of them down. Tensions deepened earlier this month after Saudi Arabia enraged Iran by executing a prominent Saudi Shiite cleric, whom the regime claimed was a terrorist. When Shiites protested in Iran and Saudi Arabia, sometimes violently, the Kingdom kicked Iran’s diplomats out of the country.

But the conflict in the region is much more nuanced than a simple sectarian war. Saudi Arabia’s rhetoric, for example, which is governed by a deeply entrenched Wahhabism, is very distinct from the Islamic State’s (also known as ISIS) use of anti-Shiism to exploit political and economic grievances against both Assad’s Shiite–Alawite regime and the dispossession of Iraq’s Sunnis under the government of then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

In fact, there are three broad kinds of sectarianism at play. Some groups and states have integrated sectarian themes into the very fabric of their political, cultural, and educational systems. Sectarianism, in other words, has been institutionalized. The most prominent example is, of course, Saudi Arabia and its centuries-old antagonism towards Shiites. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, known as the father of Wahhabism and who was present at the state’s founding, made anti-Shiism a core component of his doctrine. Another example is Iran. Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the Iranian Revolution and later Iran’s supreme leader, developed a theory of Islamic government known as “governance of the jurists.” He argued that Muslims should live under a regime overseen by legal scholars, and in particular, those trained in his Shiite tradition, who are skilled in interpreting Sharia law. His theory shaped the founding tenets of the Republic.

 

RAHEB HOMAVANDI (TIMA) / REUTERS

Protesters holding pictures of Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr are pushed back by Iranian riot police during a demonstration outside the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Tehran, January, 3, 2016.

Even some non-state communities, such as the Salafists, have institutionalized their sectarianism. Salafists claim that their conservative version of Sunnism adheres to a literal understanding of the faith that the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers practiced. They thus consider Shiites apostates. Although lacking (and in most cases even resisting) the call for a state, Salafists have systematized their opposition to Shiites over the course of the twentieth century by promoting medieval theological treatises that support their theology. In the 1960s, they even began teaching Salafism at Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia and at Wahhabi institutes around the world.

At the other end of the sectarian spectrum, incidental sectarianism, as its name implies, does not involve a deliberate effort to implement a sectarian agenda. Sectarianism does not play a central role in a state or group’s objectives, even if there are overtones of it. The most pertinent example is the Syrian civil war. It began as a conflict centered on regime change. In fact, the Assads have deliberately downplayed their Alawite affiliation precisely because it is seen as heterodox by the more dominant Twelver Shiism in Iran. To secure power and legitimacy, former President Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, therefore allied with other Shiite groups within the region, such as in Lebanon. Although there is certainly a sectarian dimension to the Syrian conflict, it is not an institutionalized part of either the war or the actors involved; it has been incidentally ascribed. The same is true of the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who belong to the minority Zaydi sect, but are not fighting the regime for sectarian reasons.

Finally, there is exploitative sectarianism, a category that characterizes the tactics and nature of many of the most violent actors in the region. ISIS, for example exploits the local power vacuum in order to build up its capabilities and amass territory. A number of Syrian opposition groups, such as Ahrar al Sham and al Nusra Front, also push a sectarian narrative in order to achieve their political goals, whether it’s to turn Syria into their version of a stable Sunni state or simply overthrow Assad. To be clear, these groups are all equally committed to their sectarian principles, but not all of them have gone as far as, say ISIS, in institutionalizing their beliefs, politically and socially.

Developing a long-term strategy for sectarian conflicts requires understanding that not all sectarianism is the same. [Emphasis in the original]

This three-tiered classification system is also a useful guide for understanding how players in the region behave. Institutional sectarians such as Saudi Arabia and Iran can also act exploitatively, that is, inject a layer of “incidental sectarianism” into an otherwise non-sectarian conflict, as we’ve seen in Syria and Yemen. Saudi Arabia also exploited its penal code to amplify the sectarian dimension of regional geopolitics by executing a high-profile Shiite figure. While precise motives are hard to identify, Saudi Arabia likely sought to elicit an aggressive Iranian response just as sanctions were being lifted or, as some have acutely suggested, remind the United States that it can stand up to Iran on its own, particularly when Washington refuses to do so.

Exploitative players might also learn to institutionalize their behaviors. We see this with ISIS. It is actively seeking to establish a system of governance—whether it’s issuing edicts on how to treat minorities or designing educational curricula. This process builds channels for ISIS to apply and perpetuate its doctrines, as well as gain credibility from those around the world who share its vision. The same is true of Syrian opposition groups. Al Nusra Front and Ahrar al Sham have set up courts and judiciary bodies that mete out their version of justice. It is worth noting that, like ISIS today, the first Saudi state, which was founded in the eighteenth century, also emerged out of a political vacuum by taking advantage of territorial opportunities created by regional neglect.

TIMA (MEHDI GHASEMI) / REUTERS

Flames rise from Saudi Arabia's embassy during a demonstration in Tehran, January 2, 2016.

Understanding the dynamic nature of sectarianism will enable the United States to respond more effectively to emerging sectarian challenges. For starters, Washington must understand that it is not constructive to disrupt institutionalized sectarianism. The United States, for example, is not able or welcome to change Saudi or Iranian societal norms, however disagreeable. A better allocation of U.S. attention and resources is to deter exploitative acts by institutional sectarians such as Saudi Arabia or Iran. This can only be done by assuming an engaged leadership role in the region—for example, working with local societies in rebuilding their infrastructure so that they do not turn to sectarian alternatives.

The same method can be applied to fighting exploitative groups such as ISIS. Although U.S. counterterrorism has recently embraced the concept of “countering violent extremism,” these efforts will eventually drag Washington down an ideological rabbit hole because it is not within the physical, legal, or political purview of the U.S. government to counter extremist narratives, which often have historic roots; for example, Sunni hostility towards Shiites for venerating their imams (and thereby, according to Sunnis, violating the principle of God’s oneness) is a polemic that can be traced back to Sunnism’s formative period. How would the United States even begin to counter that narrative?

A more reasonable initiative involves taking note of how exploitative actors use sectarian themes to their own advantage. Although Salafist literature is chock full of hatred for Shiites, it is jihadi–Salafist groups like al Qaeda and ISIS that use it to justify violent actions towards Shiites and other non-Sunni Islamic groups. Rather than proposing alternatives to these sectarian doctrines, Washington should focus on preventing these delinquents from institutionalizing their violent vision through schools and bureaucracies that perpetuate these ideas. If left unchecked, the tone and type of sectarianism that will likely be institutionalized will be ever bloodier and, perhaps, more attractive to potential recruits. That is why developing a long-term strategy for sectarian conflicts requires understanding that not all sectarianism is the same.

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Some images of Saudi bombing in Yemen in the past month, from google images:

People gather at the site of a Saudi-led air strike in Yemen's capital Sanaa January 6, 2016 Khaled Abdullah  Reuters

Three medical facilities run by Doctors Without Borders have been bombed in the past three months in the Saudi-led war in Yemen, while human rights organizations have accused the US backed coalition of war crimes for targeting civilian areas

Yemeni workers inspect the damage at a factory after it was reportedly destroyed by Saudi-led airstrikes in the capital Sanaa (AFP Photo/Mohammed Huwais)

A couple of points of interest in this al-Monitor report, highkighed in blue,  blog editorial comment in red:

Al Monitor

TURKEY PULSETÜRKİYE'NİN NABZI

US Vice President Joe Biden (L) speaks during a joint news conference with Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in Istanbul, Jan. 23, 2016. (photo by REUTERS/Murad Sezer)

How Biden annoyed Ankara during his recent visit to Turkey

The high-profile visit by US Vice President Joe Biden to Turkey last weekend produced little satisfaction and much annoyance in Ankara, especially with regard to Washington’s position on the state of democracy in Turkey and on certain developments in Syria.

Summary⎙ Print Was the US vice president's awkward talks with the Turkish president and prime minister a harbinger of even more tension in already strained ties between the two countries?

Author Semih IdizPosted January 26, 2016

Many analysts see Biden’s awkward talks with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu as a harbinger of tense moments to come in what are already strained ties between the two countries. Few, however, expect a break in ties because neither can afford that.

Ankara expected criticism from Biden with regard to what independent human rights organizations and media watchdog groups say is the hounding of journalists critical of the government’s policies and academics opposed to its current war against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

The government’s irritation, however, intensified when Biden met members of civil society groups and prominent journalists known to be in the government’s crosshairs, expressing solidarity with them ahead of talks with Erdogan and Davutoglu.

"When the media are intimidated or imprisoned for critical reporting, when Internet freedom is curtailed and social media sites … are shut down and more than 1,000 academics are accused of treason simply by signing a petition, that’s not the kind of example that needs to be set," he told reporters. Biden was referring to the imprisonment of Can Dundar, the editor-in-chief of Cumhuriyet who is in prison for reporting on the government’s illegal arms shipments to anti-regime groups in northern Syria.

He was also referring to the 1,128 academics being investigated for a petition they signed against the way the government has been conducting its war against the PKK, involving great collateral damage.

Ankara’s answer to Biden was not long in coming. “Encouraging terrorism is a crime anywhere in the world. I don’t know who prepared Mr. Biden’s program, but it is clear they did not want him to see the full picture of what is happening in Turkey,” Davutoglu told reporters prior to meeting Biden. 

The pro-government media was also quick to lambaste Biden. Under the headline “Look who's talking,” a Yeni Safak editorial argued that 75 academics had been fired in the United States for claiming Washington was behind the 9/11 attacks. It also claimed that criticizing Israel was illegal in the United States and went on to ask whether Biden was also in solidarity with whistleblowers Edward Snowden and Julian Assange. 

However, differences with regard to the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the umbrella organization of the Syrian Kurds, and the Peoples Protection Units (YPG), its military wing, emerged as the principle stumbling block in Biden’s talks with Davutoglu and Erdogan. Turkey considers the PYD and YPG terrorist organizations because of their links to the PKK. The United States, however, has allied itself with these groups in Syria and does not treat them as terror groups.

Ankara is now demanding that the PYD be barred from the Geneva talks on Syria, but appears to have made little headway in this respect during Biden’s visit. Differences on this score were also visible during the joint press conference Davutoglu and Biden held after their talks.

Despite Davutoglu’s multiple references to the YPG as a “terrorist group,” Biden restricted himself to merely saying that the United States supports Turkey’s fight against the PKK and studiously refrained from addressing either group.

Turkey is said to be considering boycotting the Geneva talks if the PYD is represented there in any shape or form. Murat Yetkin, the editor-in-chief of Hurriyet Daily News and a prominent columnist for Radikal, explained the reasons behind Ankara’s strong opposition to the PYD.

“Ankara, for security reasons, does not want a PKK-linked Kurdish group controlling an entire belt along the 910-kilometer [565-mile] Turkish-Syria border. The Turkish government thinks that a stronger PYD means a stronger PKK, which could further antagonize Turkey’s terrorism problem originating from the Kurdish issue,” Yetkin wrote for Hurriyet Jan. 26.

[Not to mention that such a corridor would permit Iraqi Kurdistan to deliver oil directly to Europe, rather than through Turkey, which would enable Iraqi Kurds to declare independence from Iraq, encouraging Turkish Kurds in their own independence efforts.  Such a corridor i entirely consistent with Western and American interests, hough not with Turkish interests; hence the conflict.] 

Pointing to a “complicated picture,” Yetkin said that boycotting the Syria talks “could make life difficult for the Turkish government.” He added, however, that “it would not make it easier for other countries and parties” either. 

Retired Ambassador Unal Cevikoz, who lectures on international politics at Istanbul’s Kadir Has University and also writes for Radikal, pointed out that the PYD does not just have US support, but also the support of Russia and Iran.

“They consider the PYD one of their most important allies in the fight against [the Islamic State] in Syria and believe it has to have a place in the future Syria,” Cevikoz argued in his column earlier this w

Cevikoz went on to maintain that Ankara’s insistence on opposing the PYD was also leading many countries to question whether Turkey is sincere when it says it wants to see a swift end to bloodshed in Syria.

[Iranian and Russian support for PYD greatly strengthens the group, and is good to see.

Ahmet Unal Cevikoz is an accomplished Turkish civvil servant as well as an respected educator.  See  Ahmet Ünal ÇeviközVikipedi, özgür ansiklopedi (Turkish Wikipedia)]

While meeting Biden in the plush surroundings of Istanbul’s Ottoman-era Yildiz Palace, Erdogan reportedly also stressed that the PYD was a terrorist organization that must not be at the table on Syria.

Tellingly, however, the press conferences planned for after the Erdogan-Biden talks was canceled, fueling speculation that the sides did not want their differences on this and other issues to be come out in front of the media.

Yasin Aktay, a deputy from the ruling Justice and Development Party who is also a columnist for Yeni Safak, argued that the US side would suffer the consequences of remaining deaf to Ankara's exhortations about the PYD.

“The US has already damaged the understanding between allies by supporting the PYD and its extensions, which are involved in acts of enmity against Turkey,” Aktay wrote in his column. He went on to warn that the price of cozying up to a merciless terrorist organization could be losing Turkey‘s friendship.

One topic on which a partial agreement was reached during Biden’s visit was the question of Turkey’s controversial deployment of forces in Bashiqa, near Mosul. Iraq considers the move a violation of its sovereignty and has demanded that the Turkish troops be withdrawn.

In a recent phone conversation with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, President Barack Obama also called for the Turkish troops to be withdrawn and demanded respect for Iraq’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. 

Unidentified Turkish officials told the press later that the sides had decided during Biden’s visit to “strengthen coordination and proceed with new initiatives on the Bashiqa camp,” though they did not elaborate.

Deniz Zeyrek, the Ankara correspondent for Hurriyet, cited unidentified sources as saying that the camp in Bashiqa, where a small number of Turkish soldiers have been training local forces against IS, will be turned over to the US-led coalition.

According to the arrangement, the Iraqi forces will also have a presence there to reaffirm Iraqi sovereignty. The deal, however, has not been finalized because Baghdad has yet to endorse it.

The bottom line is that divisions between Ankara and Washington were not bridged during Biden’s visit. All signs indicate that disagreements between the two countries on these issues will continue. This does not mean, however, that there will be a break in ties.

Turkey’s need for the United States has increased after its relations with Moscow soured to the point of near-enmity following the downing of the Russian jet in November. Washington’s need for Turkey, on the other hand, especially with regard to using strategically placed Turkish bases in the fight against IS, will also continue for the foreseeable future.

Most analysts agree that this mutual dependence will ultimately ensure that the sides continue to stress their relationship as a “strategic partnership."

Syria and the contending interests clearly described; why the outcomes mater, and to whom

Two articles that need to be read together one from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace the other from McGill University, sets out with unusual clarity the main actors in Syria, what each hopes to gain and fears to lose in the struggle for control of Syria.


One quotation from Aron Lund, Editor of Syria in Crisis and the author of the first article, is on a minor point in, and says something important about the how the human animal reacts to despair when there is no hope in the future and buoyant courage when there is.

Syrian Kurds, during the Arab Spring, were the neglected step-children of the Kurdish people.  They were impoverished, with out hope.  They were routinely mistreated by the Assad government and could not decide whether to commit to the revolution or to the government.  They were hopeless, helpless ditherers

Now they have mighty Turkey trembling in its boots.

They are judge by all to be the most valiant, successful fighters against the Islamic State, and they have the prospect of an independent nation that stretches from Iraqi Kurdistan to the Mediterranean.

That is especially significant because it  would allow landlocked Kurdistan  to pipe oil freely to Europe, pleasing some Great Powers and  seriously distressing  -- and angering -- others.

Map and image from The Economist, Striking out on their own

How did this depressed people come to be so resourceful and powerful?  Their doing so says some important about the glorious benefits and awful costs of War.

Their doing so also says something about why rich Saudi have been unable to convert any other nation to Wahhabism, its form of Islam, in spite of spending billions over the last decades trying to do so.



A quotation from Riyadh, Rumeilan, and Damascus: All You Need to Know About Syria’s Opposition Conferences

The purpose of the Rumeilan conference is to create a political wing for the SDF, called the Syrian Democratic Front (and thus also abbreviated SDF, which doesn’t help). It will promote a secular, feminist, and religiously inclusive political agenda, in tune with the PKK-backed autonomy project in Syria. It will also be flexible on all things except Kurdish autonomy, presenting itself as a moderate third force that could help bridge the gap between Assad and the Sunni Arab opposition. 

Imagine.  A " secular, feminist, and religiously inclusive political agenda" in the Middle East!  Wonderful!  And how great the cost!

The Carnegie article (the list of participating groups is omitted):

Riyadh, Rumeilan, and Damascus: All You Need to Know About Syria’s Opposition Conferences

Posted by: ARON LUND

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2015

It’s conference time in the Syrian opposition. All of a sudden, three rival meetings have kicked off, all claiming to represent the opposition to President Bashar al-Assad. One is being held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, while the other two take place inside Syria—the first in Rumeilan, a town in the Kurdish-controlled northeast, and the second in the Syrian capital of Damascus, under the watchful eyes of Assad’s security apparatus.

This rush of political meetings is a direct consequence of the agreement struck in Vienna on November 14, when a group of states calling themselves the International Syria Support Group issued a joint communiqué laying out their vision of how to resolve the conflict in Syria. The group included all the major players in Syria, such as the United States, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar. Their communiqué called for negotiations between Assad and the opposition as soon as possible, with a target date of January 1. This very early date was apparently backed by the United States and intended to gain momentum and add a sense of urgency to the process.

That may or may not have been a good idea, but the lack of time for preparations has added its own set of problems. The Assad government has a well-practiced negotiating apparatus. It has relied on more or less the same individuals in every negotiation, including a core group made up of Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad, the veteran diplomat Ahmed Arnous, and a few others. They operate under the direct oversight of Assad himself and while the government cannot be accused of flexibility or creative diplomacy, it enjoys the great diplomatic benefit of being disciplined and on-message.

The same cannot be said of the opposition, which is a mess of fractious factions. It has never managed to produce a team of negotiators that represent even a thin sliver of the insurgency on the ground. When the last round of negotiations was held in January and February 2014, the so-called Geneva II talks, the opposition delegation had extremely limited support from armed rebels on the ground and none of them were on the negotiating team. Whenever the opposition in exile meets, foreign diplomats can be seen stalking the hotel lobbies, desperately trying to shepherd all of their Syrian clients in the same direction.

That’s why the Saudi government, egged on by Americans and others, has called a major meeting of Syrian opposition factions. The Riyadh conference intends to hammer out a road map for negotiators and also, if possible, elect a diplomatic team that will represent all of the participating groups in the upcoming talks with the Assad government.

In other words, a great deal is at stake. The Americans are hurrying the process along, anxious not to waste this opportunity to get talks going. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has already expressed his wish to convene a follow-up meeting of governments involved in the Syrian war in New York by December 18, although he noted that they must first await the outcome of the Riyadh conference and “a few other issues.”

The Kremlin is less enamored with what is happening in Riyadh. The Russians have had a role in selecting the delegates in the Saudi conference, too, but they objected almost immediately to Kerry’s declaration. Russian Ambassador to the UN Vitaly Churkin told reporters on Wednesday that it would be premature to aim for a December 18 meeting in New York stating that, “In our opinion, if the meeting is held in the nearest future, it should take place in Vienna in order to continue this process and in a sense keep a distance from the hectic atmosphere of New York.”

As for Assad’s other major ally, Iran, it is even less happy about the Riyadh conference, saying that it runs counter to the spirit of Vienna. That objection is hard to take seriously as there is nothing in the Vienna statement that would prevent the opposition and its supporters from trying to produce a proper delegation before the talks. To the contrary, one could argue that it is a necessity if the talks are to succeed. But the Iranians are obviously unhappy with seeing their Saudi archrivals take center stage and more generally anxious to undermine the opposition. Making noise in the media is a cheap way of doing so.

THE RIYADH CONFERENCE

Around 100 delegates have now assembled at the Hotel Intercontinental in Riyadh. This conference has been in the works for almost a year, but repeatedly postponed until the Vienna meetings suddenly breathed new life into the peace process. Months earlier, Russians, Western Europeans, Egyptians and others had all hosted their own pre-congresses, in order to launch their favorite opposition groups on the path to future peace talks. But this is the big thing. Exile dissident Khatib Badla calls it “the first broad and serious attempt to unify the Syrian opposition.”

If so, it’s about time. In an interview today with Syria in Crisis, Noah Bonsey, a Syria expert at the International Crisis Group said that “achieving a political resolution in Syria will require some sort of opposition coalition capable of negotiating credibly, implementing what it agrees to, and protecting that deal from likely jihadi spoilers.” He explained that, “the opposition currently lacks such a vehicle, in part because its existing political bodies do not reflect the weight of armed groups on the ground and have limited credibility with the rebel base. Ideally, the gathering in Riyadh will result in a significant step toward addressing this shortcoming.”

But the risk of failure also looms large over the conference. Many in the opposition sense that Western patience with the conflict is running out and the Vienna process might be their final chance to make a difference. As Adib Shishakli, one of the participants, put it to a Saudi newspaper: “The participants know that this conference will be decisive and that it might be the last conference of the opposition.”

THE GUESTS OF THE HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL

The groups gathered at the Hotel Intercontinental reflect the wishes of the organizers. While the meeting is organized by the Saudis, it is also supported by the rest of the Friends of Syria states, including the United States, Qatar, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, France, the United Kingdom, and surely others. Russia has also been allowed to suggest delegates to the conference, despite its close alliance with Bashar al-Assad—not because Moscow is viewed as an ally of the Syrian opposition, but to give the Russians a stake in the outcome of the Riyadh conference and make sure that they stay on board for the rest of the process.

Picking who could come has not been an easy thing. Reflecting Turkey’s influence, the main Kurdish group in Syria has been excluded (more on that below) but most of the Western, Gulf, and Turkish favorites are there, as well as a few Russian-backed dissidents (names of the delegates can be found at the end of this text).

The list of invitees began around 65 but it ended up above 100. It has been expanded step-by-step to appease factions threatening to boycott and states angry that their favorite client groups were too poorly represented. There was also the question of ensuring fair representation for Syria’s ethnic and religious minorities in an otherwise heavily Sunni Arab opposition. This seems to have succeeded more or less and now a fairly impressive number of Alawites, Christians, and Druze are present. Only one group of Syrians is underrepresented to a truly extreme degree: women. But, as it happens, that doesn’t seem to bother the opposition, the regime, or their foreign sponsors.

One of the main reasons for the swelling number of participants was an argument that erupted inside the National Coalition, an exile alliance supported by the Friends of Syria coalition of governments. In the run-up to the congress, rival factions began accusing each other of trying to stack the group’s delegation to Riyadh with their own supporters. To reduce tensions, balance out discrepancies, and prevent boycotts, the organizers found themselves forced to add more and more names. The number of National Coalition members had initially been set at 20 or 21, but it ended up around 40, although some were formally invited as “independents.”

That, in turn, necessitated the addition of more delegates from other opposition blocs, such as the National Coordination Body and the Building the Syrian State Movement, two small groups of secular reformists that are partly based inside Syria. They oppose armed struggle and many of their members look favorably on the Russian intervention. Other opposition members consequently view them as a tool of Assad’s government. Russia has spent much time courting the National Coordination Body and these dissidents were apparently invited to Riyadh partly on Moscow’s urging, although several Friends of Syria governments also want them present.

THE ARMED GROUPS: FEW, BUT IMPORTANT

By contrast, the most important opposition factions are very poorly represented. The National Coalition is made up of exiles while the National Coordination Body is too small to make a difference—and its leaders live under Assad’s thumb anyway. On the ground in Syria, the armed groups fighting Assad are the only ones that truly matter to the outcome of the conflict. In Riyadh, for the first time, some of the largest groups fighting in Syria are present. This is a major step forward from the days when virtually all armed groups rejected the idea of a UN-led peace process.

As recently as two years ago, in the lead-up to the 2014 Geneva talks, most of the leading rebel groups in Syria attacked the National Coalition and called negotiations a conspiracy against the revolution, saying they would impose sharia law by military means instead. Even after the Geneva talks began, they could not bring themselves to support them, although some toned-down their hostility. But much has happened since then and now these same groups have come to Riyadh to sit alongside the National Coalition and draw up a road map for negotiations with Assad. They include Qatari- and Turkish-funded Islamists like Ahrar al-Sham, the Muslim Brotherhood-backed Sham Legion, and Saudi-linked Islamists like the Islam Army and the Asala wa-Tanmiya Front. There are also representatives of several Western-approved Free Syrian Army factions, including Turkey-based groups and members of a loose coalition known as the Southern Front, which operates out of Jordan.

For the Syrian opposition, having this level of rebel representation is a very significant step forward. If the rebels approve, a ceasefire deal agreed with Assad stands at least some chance of being implemented on the ground. If concluded against their will, it would be a dead letter.

However, only some 15 delegates are in Riyadh to represent the armed groups, although some National Coalition delegates are in fact also closely tied to armed factions (such as Heitham Rahmeh, who runs a Muslim Brotherhood-backed support structure for rebels). The proportion of armed groups was supposed to be much higher, closer to a fourth of delegates, but as more names were added to appease the squabbling exiles, the proportion of rebels sank to where it is now.

The ICG’s Noah Bonsey warns that the low percentage of armed rebels may end up being a problem. If they do not feel adequately represented, they will have a hard time selling any decisions made in Riyadh to their constituents in Syria, who are under contrary pressures from jihadi radicals. “The inclusion of leading armed factions that embrace political participation—including Ahrar al-Sham and the Islam Army—is a positive step,” Bonsey says. “But the fact that armed factions have received just 15 of more than 100 seats at the conference may lower incentives for them to invest their own credibility” in the outcome.

Indeed, the most hardline of the armed groups invited, Qatari-Turkish favorite Ahrar al-Sham, was immediately heard complaining about the  underrepresentation of rebels. The Islamists seemed particularly put off by the fact that Russia-friendly dissidents had been invited, saying some were “closer to representing the regime than the people and the revolution.”

As so many of the groups in Riyadh are funded by foreign governments, preparatory work by the sponsoring states could perhaps have smoothed relations among rival factions. But it remains to be seen how much of that has been done. According to Bonsey, the Riyadh meeting “has been rushed in order to keep up with the timeline agreed at Vienna, and neither the opposition's state backers nor its main components have a clear vision on how to resolve the imbalances in the opposition's internal equation.”

THE RUMEILAN CONGRESS

The second congress, organized in response to the one in Riyadh, is being held in Syrian Kurdistan. It has been set up by the dominant Kurdish group in that area, a branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party best known as the PKK; although in Syria it hides behind a variety of other acronyms: PYD, YPG, YPJ, TEV-DEM, and so on.

The most recent addition to that long and growing list of letters is the SDF, which stands for the Syrian Democratic Forces. It is currently the Pentagon’s favored client in Syria, receiving American ammunition deliveries in order to attack the self-proclaimed Islamic State along a lengthy frontline in the northeast. But in political terms, the PKK—which forms the core of the SDF—is much closer to Moscow than it is to Washington. The Kurds are at war with most of the Arab mainstream opposition, as well as the hardline jihadists, all of whom view the PKK and its Syrian affiliates as an ally of Russia and Assad.

While the Americans thus far have significant differences with the Kurds, just as they do with Ahrar al-Sham and other Arab rebel factions, they recognize the importance of including the Kurds in any peace talks. But, the Turks do not. The Turkish government has been at war with the PKK since the late 1970s and it absolutely refuses to allow any political role for the group. By mobilizing their allies in the National Coalition, who said they would boycott if any PKK-affiliated faction was invited, the Turks were threatening to scuttle the whole Riyadh meeting. They had their way. Kurdish members of the National Coalition will be present, but the PKK-affiliated groups will not, even though they rule around two million people inside Syria—more than the National Coalition could dream of.

Angered at their exclusion and eager to remain in the headlines, the Kurds have set up their own conference in the city of Rumeilan, in northeast Syria. The invitees are a who’s who of local PKK allies and front groups, but there are also a number of Arab and Syriac delegates flown in from elsewhere, including a splinter faction from the National Coordination Body and other allies of the leftist exile dissident Heitham Mannaa. Mannaa, who defected from the National Coordination Body this spring, was invited to the Riyadh meeting but boycotted it, partly because of the exclusion of his Kurdish allies.

The purpose of the Rumeilan conference is to create a political wing for the SDF, called the Syrian Democratic Front (and thus also abbreviated SDF, which doesn’t help). It will promote a secular, feminist, and religiously inclusive political agenda, in tune with the PKK-backed autonomy project in Syria. It will also be flexible on all things except Kurdish autonomy, presenting itself as a moderate third force that could help bridge the gap between Assad and the Sunni Arab opposition. It’s a smart move and will be hard to handle for the Americans, who are already backing the Kurds against the Islamic State. How could they explain that they are sending arms to this group, but simultaneously have it excluded from the peace talks?

THE DAMASCUS CONGRESS

The meeting in Damascus is the least important of the three conferences. It gathers a few self-described groups that weren’t invited elsewhere, mostly because they are seen as too close to the regime they claim to oppose. Examples include the Solidarity Party, the National Youth Party, the National Democratic Action Body, and others—fifteen or seventeen in total. They are all based in Syria. A few are formally illegal but generally tolerated by the security services, while others operate legally inside the Baath Party-controlled political framework. Some of the attendees at the Damascus conference are believed by the rest of the opposition, including many moderates in the National Coordination Body, to be regime proxies or informers. However, the assembly also includes some pre-2011 dissidents. They include the lawyer Mahmoud Merei, a longstanding Arab nationalist dissident and human rights activist who now heads the National Democratic Action Body and took part in the protests of 2011.

The groups assembled in Damascus may very well reflect the views of a significant number of Syrians who would like to see reforms but who, at the end of the day, prefer Assad over the rebels. But that doesn’t matter: they are still irrelevant to the outcome of the conflict. All of these groups are very small, lack independent leverage over either the government or the opposition, and cannot protect themselves against either side. If Assad wins, he will not let them have any influence, and if Assad loses, the rebels will not let them have any influence. And that’s the end of that.

The reason they are allowed to hold a congress in Damascus is because Assad is seeking to disrupt the Riyadh proceedings by pushing a rival "internal opposition" into the limelight. Mohammed Aboul-Qasem, head of the Solidarity Party—which was legalized in 2011 and is viewed with such favor by the government that it has just been licensed to issue a newspaper in Damascus—exemplified that strategy very well when he attacked the Riyadh meeting in comments to a pro-Assad newspaper, saying it didn’t represent the “opposition on the inside.”

The Baathists may also hope that the Damascus conference will help them foist a few of their own allies on the rest of the opposition, when the time comes for real negotiations. Slim chance, but no harm in trying.

MUCH IS AT STAKE IN RIYADH

The only one of these conferences that truly matters is the one in Riyadh.

Whether or not its organizers accept it, the Damascus meeting is a mere plaything of the Assad regime. As for the PKK-linked Kurdish groups that are meeting in Rumeilan, they represent a powerful military force and they are increasingly well connected in both Russia and the United States. It will be impossible to exclude them from any serious peace process in Syria, no matter what the Turks say. But the Rumeilan conference is mostly political theatre, a reshuffling of cards that the Kurdish leaders were already playing. In the end, it will matter very little to the political game outside Syrian Kurdistan.

In Riyadh, however, much is at stake. If the conference fails, through high-profile defections or a failure to reach agreement, the opposition will have stumbled on the threshold of the new peace process. Assad, Iran, and Russia will be overjoyed and current trends in the West, where countries are fast losing the last of their faith in Syria’s opposition, will be reinforced. But if the conference succeeds in producing a joint platform and keeps all the major groups on board, particularly the armed ones, it will have been a step toward a real political process—a necessary step, but not in itself sufficient.

Many problems remain, including the difficulty of accommodating hardline Islamist demands in a process geared to produce a political compromise, while also not alienating the rebel fighters that need to be involved for the process to have any meaning. Ahrar al-Sham opened the talks demanding “the complete cleansing of the Russian-Iranian occupation of Syrian land, and the sectarian militias which support it,” also calling for the “overthrow of the Assad regime with all its pillars and symbols, and handing them over for fair trial.” The United States, for its part, is imploring the opposition to come up with "creative language" on the issue of whether Bashar al-Assad should stay or go, seeing a measure of intentional ambiguity as the only realistic way to move forward.

They have their work cut out for them in Riyadh.

The McGill article



McGill International Review

No End in Sight: The Syrian Conflict in 2016

MARCO LONGARI/AFP/GettyImages

1. A teacher, carrying bread, strains to avoid sniper fire in Aleppo’s old city.

Once magnificent cities now lying in ruins. Wailing mothers, holding lifeless infants to their chests. Ghastly images of starvation and pestilence. Beheadings and medieval-style siege warfare. Nearly five years and 250,000 lives into Syria’s cataclysmic civil war, such distressing images continue to flood our screens, eliciting all sorts of reactions. What does 2016 hold in store for a conflict which has devolved into the most severe humanitarian crisis of our times? The answer to this question will be determined by the political elites of capitals far from the smoking rubbles of Aleppo or Homs, by whom the Syrian conflict has been made into a proxy struggle more complex even than the Spanish Civil War.

Two key contestants in the Syrian arena are longstanding regional rivals: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the outbreak of the civil war, Saudi Arabia, followed by neighboring Qatar, has been the main source of material support for the overwhelmingly Sunni Arab insurgency against the Iranian- and Russian-backed Assad regime. In the late spring of 2015, the Salafist rebels of the Ahrar al-Sham brigades – working alongside other Islamist factions and Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate – appeared to make the insurgency’s most significant territorial gains to date, expelling regime forces from most of Idlib Governorate.

However, since the escalation last autumn of Russia’s involvement on behalf of its client regime in Damascus, a tide which had tentatively seemed to be shifting in favour of the Saudi-backed insurgency has since violently swung back in Assad’s direction. At best for the Kingdom, the battle to determine Syria’s future has once more degenerated into the military stalemate that has characterized it for most of the last five years.

In the last month alone, the Assad regime has managed, with Russian assistance, to eliminate several prominent leaders of the insurgency. Should the affected Saudi-funded groups, such as Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam, prove to be too internally fractious to survive the targeting of heavyweight commanders, this will not bode well for Riyadh’s strategy of removing Assad from power. Additionally, the mounting fiscal strains that have accompanied the plunge in oil prices and the Saudis’ expensive intervention against the Iranian-backed Houthi militants of neighbouring Yemen could prompt Riyadh to retrench its Syrian efforts: staving off unrest on the home front, where youth employment remains at unseemly levels and 70% of the population is aged 30 and under, may assume heightened precedence. Such considerations must certainly have played a part in the Saudis’ recent acquiescence to Iran’s inclusion, for the first time, in international discussions regarding the Syrian crisis. Growing concerns over recently announced austerity measures also seem to have encouraged a keener interest in diplomacy among the insurgency’s most committed backers.

Nevertheless, any potential retrenchment of Saudi support for the Syrian insurgency in 2016 is likely to be a purely tactical manoeuvre. Despite the recent announcement of a budget shortfall of approximately 15% of GDP, “the largest single allocation in the [2016] budget was [$58.6 billion] to the military and security services, comprising more than 25% of the total – a much higher allocation than that of [sic] 2015 budget.” Indeed, IHS Jane’s forecasts “Saudi Arabian defense-specific spending to increase to around $60 billion a year by 2020,” indicating a sturdiness to Riyadh’s resolve in the face of what it perceives as intensifying Iranian efforts to undermine Saudi interests in the region. The Kingdom’s determination to contain Iran’s regional influence and not see its investments in the Syrian rebellion frittered away will only be reinforced as a result of Tehran’s reaction to the Saudis’ execution of dissident Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr earlier this month.

REUTERS/Asmaa Waguih

2. A rebel position in Aleppo

The nuclear deal agreed between world powers and Iran last spring has the potential to profoundly reshape regional politics along lines that better accommodate the Islamic Republic’s interests. Buoyed by the dual prospects of a windfall from the release of frozen assets and much increased inflows of foreign capital, Tehran may feel it has some leeway in 2016 to escalate its already extensive efforts to preserve the Assad regime, which, unlike Riyadh’s on behalf of the rebels, have involved boots on Syrian soil. Analysts estimate that 2015 saw between 60 and 70 Iranian military or security personnel killed in Syria, out of 140 in total since the outbreak of the war.

Much of the Iranian presence in Syria is composed of officers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Directly controlled by Iran’s Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Khamenei, the IRGC is a “paramilitary force rolled into an intelligence agency wrapped in a giant business conglomerate with security related interests”. The Guards sit “[a]t the centre of Iran’s establishment”, and its officers are said by several sources to have assumed operational command of Assad’s forces along several fronts, sidelining Syrian officers. The Guards have shown themselves willing to pay significant costs to maintain a friendly relationship with whoever rules in Damascus. (In the past the Assad regime has facilitated the IRGC’s funneling of funds, arms and personnel towards proxy groups across the Arab world.) In October, Hossein Hamedani, an IRGC Brigadier General and the Corps’ Deputy Commander, was reportedly killed by IS militants on the outskirts of Aleppo.

2016 could conceivably witness some change in the nature of Iran’s involvement in the Syrian civil war. The IRGC would be at the centre of any such shift. Ayatollah Khamenei is officially 76 years old, and reportedly suffers from prostate cancer. Iran expert Majid Rafizadeh expects that IRGC leaders will play a decisive role in selecting Khamenei’s successor, and posits that they will select “a candidate who is not a powerful or influential figure, resembling [Khamenei] at the beginning of his rule.” If the Islamic Republic gets a new Supreme Leader in 2016, he will likely be a “lesser-known cleric” who will grant the Guards “free rein in political and economic affairs.” By the time the next Supreme Leader comes into office, Rafizadeh reckons, Iran may bear a much closer resemblance to a conventional military dictatorship.

The consequences of such a shift for the conflict in Syria depend on the ends to which the IRGC leadership will use a potential increase in the Guards’ political and economic leverage. Although the hawkish Guards require the spectre of external enemies in order to justify repression at home (and, aside from the Western powers, the Syrian insurgency, dominated by hardline Sunni Islamists bearing at least some resemblance to the rabidly anti-Shia, anti-Iranian IS, fits this bill perfectly), and relations between the Guards and Iran’s reformist President Rouhani are believed to be icy at best, senior IRGC commanders have openly supported the nuclear agreement. Assuming that Mr. Khamenei does indeed die or is incapacitated in 2016, the consolidation of power at home may stretch the Guards and could conceivably temper their determination to secure a favourable outcome in Syria. However, should 2016 also see the provisions of the nuclear deal produce a financial windfall for IRGC-controlled entities, then the costs of the Guards’ active involvement in Syria at a sensitive time of political transition back home might be significantly offset. In such a scenario, Iranian support for regime forces and allied militias would be maintained at its currently high level, or even increased in the face of mounting rebel losses and in the hopes of dealing a decisive blow to the insurgency.

Iranian interests in Syria are well aligned with those of Russia, whose momentous entry into the Syrian morass late last year has given the conflict an added layer of complexity at the outset of 2016.  As discussed by Mitchell A. Orenstein and George Romer in an October article for Foreign Affairs, “most of the foreign belligerents in … Syria are gas-exporting countries with interests in one of the two competing pipeline projects that seek to cross Syrian territory to deliver either Qatari or Iranian gas to Europe.” It is not difficult to see why Moscow should take a particularly keen interest in this issue.

According to Eurostat, in 2013 Russia provided some 33.5% of the EU-28’s crude oil imports and 39% of its imports of natural gas. The Russian state oil company Gazprom sells 80% of its gas to Europe. Moscow thus has a vital interest in controlling European gas supplies. When in 2009 Qatar proposed building a pipeline to transport its gas via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria to Turkey and further on to Europe, the Russians – fearful of the possible effects such a pipeline would have on Russia’s share of the European energy market – successfully lobbied the Assad regime to reject this proposal in favour of an alternative Iran-Iraq-Syria route, proposed by the Islamic Republic. This alternative pipeline “would pump Iranian gas … out via Syrian ports [on the Mediterranean] such as Latakia”, which happens to be less than 85 km away from the port city of Tartus, site of Russia’s last remaining naval facility since the USSR. As pointed out by Orenstein and Romer, the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline would provide Iran with an opportunity to expand its lacking gas export infrastructure, while “Russia would rather see the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline built or no pipeline at all.” The energy ministers of the three Middle Eastern nations announced a preliminary agreement regarding the pipeline in 2011, with the blessings of a Moscow which “possibly believ[ed] that Russia would have an easier time dealing with Iran (unlike Qatar, not home to a U.S. base) to control gas imports to Europe from Iran, the Caspian Sea region, and Central Asia.”

Russia’s previous military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine were at least partly about protecting its preeminent position in European energy markets, “[a]nd it is reasonable to expect that Russia will go down fighting to prevent a Qatari pipeline from crossing Syria on its way to Europe and to make Iranian exports reliant on Russian support.” Orenstein and Romer claim that “this explains why Russia has chosen to target Qatari- and Saudi-funded rebel groups in Syria in its bombing campaign.” However, as argued by Syria analyst Aaron Lund, despite the focus in the West on the apparent paucity of Russian raids on IS positions in Syria, it must be remembered that “Russia did not intervene against anyone in particular, it intervened for Assad. Who gets hurt depends on who stands in his way.” Nonetheless, while tackling IS is not the principal objective of Putin’s intervention, should the jihadists shift focus from efforts against Kurdish and rebel groups towards assaults on better-fortified population centres held by the regime and affiliated militias, 2016 could see a more decisive Russian contribution to anti-IS efforts.

Skeptics will point out that while the Russians, like their Saudi and Qatari adversaries, are greatly dependent on hydrocarbon revenues, the steep drop in the price of oil since 2014 has probably hit Russia hardest. Combined with factors such as the imposition of Western sanctions over the Ukrainian crisis and consequently exacerbated structural imbalances in the Russian economy, the oil price drop contributed in 2015 to an increase in the proportion of Russian households unable to afford either sufficient food or clothing to 39% – a 17 point increase from the previous year. Real wages fell 9.2% year-on-year in the first 11 months of 2015, and the economy is believed to have shrunk by around 4% over the same period. Surely the Kremlin will not be able to afford any extended overseas campaign?

Despite the penury Mr. Putin’s foreign adventurism has brought upon ordinary Russians, however, the Kremlin is unlikely to scale back its potentially game-changing military involvement in Syria unless severe popular pressure – like that previously seen in the run-up to Putin’s re-election as President in 2011-12 – comes to bear in 2016 (with Putin’s approval rating hovering around 90%, however, this does not seem too likely in the short-run, barring any major crises). For one thing, American analysts believe that the cost to Russia of maintaining the aerial intervention at its current intensity – an annual outlay of $1-2 billion from the total defence budget of approximately $54 billion – is sufficiently low for Mr. Putin to “sustain military operations at this level for years.” Having achieved its preliminary objective of stabilising the Assad regime and halting its opponents’ momentum, Russia will look to use the elimination of several senior rebel commanders to escalate its support for the regime and the affiliated militias, and enabling them to go on the offensive in 2016. The Assad regime could thus exploit the insurgents’ disarray to retake the areas ceded in spring and summer of 2015, although the likelihood of this occurring in 2016 depends as much on the capabilities of the Syrian state and army eroded by years of war as on the rebels’ sorry condition. As Mr. Lund reports, the issuing of “desperate sounding call[s] for outside support and foreign fighters” by rebel groups that, until recently, had aggressively marketed their home-grown credentials appears to have sown further division among the ranks of the Saudi- and Qatari-backed insurgents.

Moreover, Mr. Putin may take further encouragement from recent developments which appear to have put a main objective of his Syrian gambit – ending Russia’s international isolation – within reach. As Ingo Mannteufel puts it, “increased Russian involvement in Syria can be understood only by viewing it through the prism of Ukraine” and the consequences Putin’s intervention in that country have had for the Russian economy and, by extension, the stability of the ex-KGB man’s regime. In the wake of an unprecedented refugee crisis and the November attacks in Paris, Russia has been reasonably successful presenting itself to the European public opinion (and not a few governments) as taking a hard line against the jihadi terror and being a potentially constructive partner in the search for a solution in Syria. 2016 could well spell the end of Europe’s contribution to the debilitating Ukraine-related sanctions regime which has ensnared the Russian bear since 2014. Mannteufel believes that the EU’s “cohesion has been hit hard by the Greek crisis, the refugee crisis, the terrorist threat and the growing strength of ant-European forces”. With relations between the Kremlin and Eurosceptic groups – which may soon be in government across the continent (or will, in any case, be playing a much greater role in policymaking) – getting increasingly cozy, 2016 may well see “a slowly forming pro-Assad constituency” among EU states come to the Kremlin’s rescue in 2016.)

THE GUARDIAN

3. A street in the city of Homs: before and after the war

Indeed, some EU diplomats have already stated that Putin’s intervention on behalf of the Assad regime has divided European governments over the issue of EU sanctions against Russia. These sanctions expire at the end of this month and require approval by all 28 of the bloc’s members to be extended. One diplomat told Bloomberg that some member states “have signaled that Europe needs the Kremlin’s help to stop the influx of refugees,” which has become a priority in the European capital, “and may take a softer line.” The EU Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker recently expressed his belief that “we need to improve out relationship with Russia.” Meanwhile, a report carried by Bild alleges that Germany’s spy agency, despite Berlin’s public denunciation of the Kremlin’s Syrian bombing campaign, “is working again with the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s secret service to swap information on Islamist militants”. Another continental heavyweight, France, has appeared to deprioritize Assad’s removal. With IS claiming the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula just weeks prior to the November 13 attacks in Paris (one of the two major jihadi assaults that roiled the French capital last year), Mr. Putin swiftly sympathized with Russia and France’s shared experiences of the IS terror. As reported by the BBC, “Straight after the Paris attacks, Mr Putin ordered his military to coordinate with the French in the campaign against IS – an unprecedented act given that France is in Nato.” Such moves could indicate that the Assad regime’s Kremlin benefactors will focus diplomatic efforts on wooing Syria’s former colonial overlords this year. “After all, France and Russia … are two great nations lying at either end of the European continent – with a shared interest in preventing its domination by outsiders (the US) or insiders (Germany).”

3 million additional refugees from the Syrian war are expected to head to Europe in 2016, and there is no cap in sight to the flow of foreign fighters to and from the jihadi battlefields of Syria, where civilians have begun to flee in large numbers even from relatively safe government-held areas. The inevitable shift in European priorities prompted by developments in 2015 mean that 2016 will almost certainly bring increasing European tolerance for the Kremlin’s clients in Damascus.

How the Europeans’ desire for stability in the face of unprecedented economic and cultural convulsions, and their possible willingness to cooperate with the Assad regime, translate into developments on the ground in Syria depends above all on the regime itself. While the outflow of refugees from relatively peaceful regime-held cities and towns may simply reflect the fact that Syrians under regime control are mostly urban and, therefore, better able to afford means of escape (unlike rural Syrians in areas under the insurgents’ control), it further signals the erosion of state institutions. The Economist reports that “Many [refugees] come from the regime’s outposts, such as western Aleppo,” which is believed to provide the bulk of those seeking refuge in Europe in 2016. “[R]elying as it does on air cover to maintain supplies, [western Aleppo] feels increasingly fragile. Services have deteriorated even in the richest parts of the capital. A middle-income country has collapsed into one in which 80% of people are “in need”, according to the UN.”

Although estimates put the proportion of the Syrian population under regime control at 50-70%, Mr. Lund rightly points out that should Assad’s government prove unable to muster “the resources or the institutional capacity to rebuild [the] areas” it reconquers under Russian air cover, “then it will rule no more effectively than the rebels.” And if Assad’s battered regime proves too dependent on the radical sectarian militias that have fought alongside it to allow Sunni refugees back into their homes, and “cannot in fact operate as an institutional state and a national government, then President Assad is just a warlord with a fancy title.” (The Iranians have empowered such auxiliary groups as a hedging strategy in case Assad’s regime does buckle under pressure).

Should the strategic balance shift decisively towards the regime in 2016, presenting it with the opportunity to re-impose some semblance of state authority and to resuscitate public institutions in areas it retakes from the weakened rebels, the regime must take it if the conditions of fragmentation and warlordism that have engulfed the Syrian countryside are not to become permanent. It is now or never for the Assad regime.

As discussed above, however, the long-term goals of Putin’s pro-government intervention largely revolve around Russia’s strategic interests with respect to European energy markets. An as yet cash-strapped Kremlin is unlikely to have much interest in footing the bill for the postwar reconstruction of Syria, even if such an undertaking is to proceed under the aegis of its client regime. In all likelihood, Mr. Putin is intent on remedying the prevailing state of anarchic decay only up to a degree where Russia’s strategic needs can just about be met. While Mr. Putin will enthusiastically assist Mr. Assad when it comes to knocking buildings down, he will almost certainly be much less eager to help him pull them back up.

THE GUARDIAN

4. The old souk in Aleppo: before and after the war

Whichever trajectory Syria’s confoundingly multidimensional conflict takes in 2016, Russia’s intervention on behalf of the regime is likely to be a major driving force behind developments on the ground. Yet the country weighing on many minds in the new year will be Turkey. As the only NATO member-state directly bordering Syria, Turkey has had a long history of geopolitical rivalry with the Russians (old antagonisms seemed to have re-emerged in November, with the Turks’ downing a Russian Su-24 near the Turkey-Syria border and the ensuing standoff between the two countries). Under the leadership of President Recep Tayipp Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey has – in conjunction with Saudi Arabia and Qatar – sought to dislodge the Russians’ client regime in Damascus by providing the Islamist-led rebellion with arms and logistical support. A host of reasons, ranging from pipeline economics to grand strategy, explains the Turks’ anti-Assad stance.

Nevertheless, developments in 2015 have made it clear that despite Ankara’s implacable opposition to the Assad regime, toppling the Syrian president has fallen down among its list of priorities. With the renewal last summer of hostilities between the Turkish government and the militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – partly a consequence of Mr. Erdoğan’s own cynical attempts to concentrate power in the hands of a hitherto ceremonial presidency – Turkey’s Kurdish question has once again come to the fore. Daily reports of violence between government forces and militants from Turkey’s Kurdish southeast have polarized the society. The AKP government’s main concern regarding Syria in 2016 will be to prevent Kurdish groups in that country – the most important of which are affiliated with the PKK – from consolidating the mini-state they have carved out along most of the Syria-Turkey frontier.

In his address in June Mr. Erdoğan promised, “We will never allow the establishment of a state in Syria’s north and our south. We will continue our fight in this regard no matter what it costs.” The spectre of an independent Kurdish state just south of the border, and the encouragement this would give secessionists among Turkey’s own Kurds at a time of heightened tensions, has saddled Erdoğan with a dilemma. Christopher de Bellaigue of the NYRB reports: “[i]t’s widely accepted in Turkey that the president was hoping ISIS would crush Kobanî and other self-governing Kurdish cantons; but this would have brought him into disagreement with the US, which saw the Syrian [Kurds] – despite [their] links to the Turkish PKK – as a potentially useful ally against the jihadis.” Indeed, Mr. Lund reckons that developments in 2015 definitively cemented the Kurds’ place as the US’s most effective ally on the ground against IS in Syria. “Militarily,” says Lund, “it is a match made in heaven and the results are impressive. Despite their limited numbers, the Kurds have created a disciplined force that uses [American] air support effectively. They’re chewing up jihadis and spitting them out from Kobane to Hassakeh.” Notwithstanding the alliance between the Syrian Kurds and the US, however, last autumn the Turks struck Tal Abyad , “a largely Arab border town that the Kurds captured from the Islamic State over the summer”. Turkey even summoned the American ambassador to raise its concerns over the issue of US support for the Syrian Kurds.

The Syrian Kurds’ ejection of IS from Tal Abyad last summer “meant ISIS had lost two out of the three crossing points from Turkey through which it could bring foreign volunteers, finance, and weaponry to strengthen the jihad.” Should the Kurds manage to dislodge IS from its final border-crossing point with Turkey at the town of Jarablus in 2016, as appears to be their intention, then they will have secured an unbroken line of communication between all the self-governing cantons they currently hold and establish the territorial basis for an autonomous entity. Should Jarablus fall, then – if the brazen nature of Turkey’s recent military incursion into northern Iraq is any indication – the Turks may well “make a military move into northern Syria” in 2016. Jonathan Steele thinks that much will hinge on whether the US provides air support for any Kurdish offensive on Jarablus. But should Erdoğan and the AKP fail in 2016 to push through the constitutional amendment required in order to establish the presidential system “necessary to adapt to global changes”, a potentially momentous escalation of Turkish involvement in Syria will be all the more likely.

While this report has covered each of the external belligerents in Syria’s proxy war and how their respective priorities may impact the conflict in 2016, many possibilities have been neglected. Most egregiously, the role of the US and the likely election of Hillary Clinton as president later this year have not been discussed – but this is not in the least due to the frustratingly hands-off approach taken by the superpower towards the Syrian catastrophe. Iraqi Kurdistan could formally declare independence in the near future, with major ramifications in the Syrian arena, especially as concerns Turkey and, to a lesser degree, Iran. Although unlikely, the oil price could rise in 2016. Syrian refugees currently residing in neighbouring Arab countries, where the prospects of higher living standards are bleak for many and most are subject to a raft of restrictions, could conceivably engage in some form of unrest, further destabilizing the regional situation. Were anything to happen to President Assad, who may or may not have inherited his father’s poor health, its ramifications will be far-reaching. What is certain, however, is that 2016 will not bring an end to the ordeal of ordinary Syrians.

Image Credits:

1. MARCO LONGARI/AFP/GettyImages

2. REUTERS/Asmaa Waguih

3. The Guardian

4. The Guardian

Music you shouldn't miss

From my husband:  it's fun, is it music? magic? does it full you with wonder?

Two Serbian guys, what they don't do to a 

cello can't be done!

From my daughter: :for her upcoming nuptials with Stacy

If you can see this and your feet don't move, you ain't as human as you might think you are.

From me, suggested by my daughter: 

The music is god; the video is great.

IP Pipeline blocked again by US intransigence: stupid, harmful to the national interest of all concerned

No US or English news outlet reports on the effect of implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal on the IP Pipeline and I don't know why.

One Iranian outlet, PessTV reported a story that was repeated by one Pakistani newspaper. Eurasian Review carried the most complete report.  Eurasian Review is a New Work political risk consultancy, judged reliable and cautions.

One could reasonably hope that the Iran Nuclear deal would put an en o the doomed US attempts to prevent Iran from exporting energy.  That seems not to be the case. Stupid and cruel, and counterproductive!

Eurasian Review

A Journal of Analysis and News

Iran Responds To Pakistani ‘Sanctions’ By Threatening Legal Action Over Unfinished Gas Pipeline

 Locations of Iran (green) and Pakistan. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

BY AL BAWABA NEWS JANUARY 9, 2016

A senior Iranian official has said that Tehran will take action should Pakistan fail to meet its obligations with regard to the construction of a pipeline for receiving Iran’s natural gas.

“Iran has taken plenty of measures with regard to gas exports to Pakistan and has already laid out a major part of the pipelines as far as the Pakistani borders,” Ali-Reza Kameli, CEO of National Iranian Gas Exports Company, said.

“It would be natural that every country would think about the interests of its own people. Therefore, if Pakistan’s action harms our interests we will definitely act in line with terms of the contract,” Iranian petroleum ministry’s official monthly Iran Petroleum quoted Kameli as saying.

He complained that Pakistan has not taken “any specific action with regard to the construction of 780 kilometers of gas pipeline on its soil under the pretext of sanctions on Iran.”

“Therefore, the project has been held in abeyance…In every contract, penalties are envisaged for non-compliance with obligations, but Iran does not like to enter the phase of penalties vis-à-vis its neighboring country with which it has friendly ties,” said Kameli.

Iran plans to deliver 21.5 mcm/d of gas to Pakistan.

Iran looks on course to emerge from sanctions under a July 2015 nuclear deal.

However, Islamabad was dragging its feet even before the West imposed new sanctions on Tehran in 2012.

The US has long pressed Pakistani officials against going for the pipeline, promoting Turkmen over Iranian natural gas even though the route requires the extra mile of more than 700 km across volatile regions in Afghanistan.

The energy crisis in Pakistan which suffers about 12 hours of power cuts a day has worsened in recent years amid 4,000 megawatts of electricity shortfall.

Iran has completed its part of the gas pipeline project with more than $2 billion of investment but Pakistan has fallen behind the target to take gas deliveries in the winter of 2014.

Contractually, Pakistan has to pay steep fines to Iran for failing to build and operate its section of the pipeline by the winter of 2014.

For more on the IP Pipeline, see

A chance for leverage by Balochi and Uighurs, those willing to die for freedom as they define freedom

Oil out of Iran and the shameful but real thrust for it