Mansouled Fiery Islands: Kurdistan

A couple of points of interest in this al-Monitor report, highkighed in blue, blog editorial comment in red:

Al Monitor

TURKEY PULSETÜRKİYE'NİN NABZI

US Vice President Joe Biden (L) speaks during a joint news conference with Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in Istanbul, Jan. 23, 2016. (photo by REUTERS/Murad Sezer)

How Biden annoyed Ankara during his recent visit to Turkey

The high-profile visit by US Vice President Joe Biden to Turkey last weekend produced little satisfaction and much annoyance in Ankara, especially with regard to Washington’s position on the state of democracy in Turkey and on certain developments in Syria.

Summary⎙ Print Was the US vice president's awkward talks with the Turkish president and prime minister a harbinger of even more tension in already strained ties between the two countries?

Author Semih IdizPosted January 26, 2016

Many analysts see Biden’s awkward talks with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu as a harbinger of tense moments to come in what are already strained ties between the two countries. Few, however, expect a break in ties because neither can afford that.

Ankara expected criticism from Biden with regard to what independent human rights organizations and media watchdog groups say is the hounding of journalists critical of the government’s policies and academics opposed to its current war against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

The government’s irritation, however, intensified when Biden met members of civil society groups and prominent journalists known to be in the government’s crosshairs, expressing solidarity with them ahead of talks with Erdogan and Davutoglu.

"When the media are intimidated or imprisoned for critical reporting, when Internet freedom is curtailed and social media sites … are shut down and more than 1,000 academics are accused of treason simply by signing a petition, that’s not the kind of example that needs to be set," he told reporters. Biden was referring to the imprisonment of Can Dundar, the editor-in-chief of Cumhuriyet who is in prison for reporting on the government’s illegal arms shipments to anti-regime groups in northern Syria.

He was also referring to the 1,128 academics being investigated for a petition they signed against the way the government has been conducting its war against the PKK, involving great collateral damage.

Ankara’s answer to Biden was not long in coming. “Encouraging terrorism is a crime anywhere in the world. I don’t know who prepared Mr. Biden’s program, but it is clear they did not want him to see the full picture of what is happening in Turkey,” Davutoglu told reporters prior to meeting Biden.

The pro-government media was also quick to lambaste Biden. Under the headline “Look who's talking,” a Yeni Safak editorial argued that 75 academics had been fired in the United States for claiming Washington was behind the 9/11 attacks. It also claimed that criticizing Israel was illegal in the United States and went on to ask whether Biden was also in solidarity with whistleblowers Edward Snowden and Julian Assange.

However, differences with regard to the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the umbrella organization of the Syrian Kurds, and the Peoples Protection Units (YPG), its military wing, emerged as the principle stumbling block in Biden’s talks with Davutoglu and Erdogan. Turkey considers the PYD and YPG terrorist organizations because of their links to the PKK. The United States, however, has allied itself with these groups in Syria and does not treat them as terror groups.

Ankara is now demanding that the PYD be barred from the Geneva talks on Syria, but appears to have made little headway in this respect during Biden’s visit. Differences on this score were also visible during the joint press conference Davutoglu and Biden held after their talks.

Despite Davutoglu’s multiple references to the YPG as a “terrorist group,” Biden restricted himself to merely saying that the United States supports Turkey’s fight against the PKK and studiously refrained from addressing either group.

Turkey is said to be considering boycotting the Geneva talks if the PYD is represented there in any shape or form. Murat Yetkin, the editor-in-chief of Hurriyet Daily News and a prominent columnist for Radikal, explained the reasons behind Ankara’s strong opposition to the PYD.

“Ankara, for security reasons, does not want a PKK-linked Kurdish group controlling an entire belt along the 910-kilometer [565-mile] Turkish-Syria border. The Turkish government thinks that a stronger PYD means a stronger PKK, which could further antagonize Turkey’s terrorism problem originating from the Kurdish issue,” Yetkin wrote for Hurriyet Jan. 26.

[Not to mention that such a corridor would permit Iraqi Kurdistan to deliver oil directly to Europe, rather than through Turkey, which would enable Iraqi Kurds to declare independence from Iraq, encouraging Turkish Kurds in their own independence efforts. Such a corridor i entirely consistent with Western and American interests, hough not with Turkish interests; hence the conflict.]

Pointing to a “complicated picture,” Yetkin said that boycotting the Syria talks “could make life difficult for the Turkish government.” He added, however, that “it would not make it easier for other countries and parties” either.

Retired Ambassador Unal Cevikoz, who lectures on international politics at Istanbul’s Kadir Has University and also writes for Radikal, pointed out that the PYD does not just have US support, but also the support of Russia and Iran.

“They consider the PYD one of their most important allies in the fight against [the Islamic State] in Syria and believe it has to have a place in the future Syria,” Cevikoz argued in his column earlier this w

Cevikoz went on to maintain that Ankara’s insistence on opposing the PYD was also leading many countries to question whether Turkey is sincere when it says it wants to see a swift end to bloodshed in Syria.

[Iranian and Russian support for PYD greatly strengthens the group, and is good to see.

Ahmet Unal Cevikoz is an accomplished Turkish civvil servant as well as an respected educator. See Ahmet Ünal ÇeviközVikipedi, özgür ansiklopedi (Turkish Wikipedia)]

While meeting Biden in the plush surroundings of Istanbul’s Ottoman-era Yildiz Palace, Erdogan reportedly also stressed that the PYD was a terrorist organization that must not be at the table on Syria.

Tellingly, however, the press conferences planned for after the Erdogan-Biden talks was canceled, fueling speculation that the sides did not want their differences on this and other issues to be come out in front of the media.

Yasin Aktay, a deputy from the ruling Justice and Development Party who is also a columnist for Yeni Safak, argued that the US side would suffer the consequences of remaining deaf to Ankara's exhortations about the PYD.

“The US has already damaged the understanding between allies by supporting the PYD and its extensions, which are involved in acts of enmity against Turkey,” Aktay wrote in his column. He went on to warn that the price of cozying up to a merciless terrorist organization could be losing Turkey‘s friendship.

One topic on which a partial agreement was reached during Biden’s visit was the question of Turkey’s controversial deployment of forces in Bashiqa, near Mosul. Iraq considers the move a violation of its sovereignty and has demanded that the Turkish troops be withdrawn.

In a recent phone conversation with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, President Barack Obama also called for the Turkish troops to be withdrawn and demanded respect for Iraq’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Unidentified Turkish officials told the press later that the sides had decided during Biden’s visit to “strengthen coordination and proceed with new initiatives on the Bashiqa camp,” though they did not elaborate.

Deniz Zeyrek, the Ankara correspondent for Hurriyet, cited unidentified sources as saying that the camp in Bashiqa, where a small number of Turkish soldiers have been training local forces against IS, will be turned over to the US-led coalition.

According to the arrangement, the Iraqi forces will also have a presence there to reaffirm Iraqi sovereignty. The deal, however, has not been finalized because Baghdad has yet to endorse it.

The bottom line is that divisions between Ankara and Washington were not bridged during Biden’s visit. All signs indicate that disagreements between the two countries on these issues will continue. This does not mean, however, that there will be a break in ties.

Turkey’s need for the United States has increased after its relations with Moscow soured to the point of near-enmity following the downing of the Russian jet in November. Washington’s need for Turkey, on the other hand, especially with regard to using strategically placed Turkish bases in the fight against IS, will also continue for the foreseeable future.

Most analysts agree that this mutual dependence will ultimately ensure that the sides continue to stress their relationship as a “strategic partnership."

This report from theKurdish region of North Iraq and should be read in conjunction with the earlier post, Crumbing Syria and the future of Kurds and Shia Iraq. Kurds there have a much betteer life than their kin in Turkey, Syria, and Iran. Kurds in Iran have oil, and hat gives money and clout to help their kin. This same article appeared earlier in The National.

Kurdistan’s capital is a boom town with a big problem

31 Dec 12
Robin Mills(the National)

The bar sports a tequila dispenser. Outside the hotel, several Iranians are talking business while black Land Cruisers hurtle past. Lining the street to the ancient citadel that marks the town centre are shops selling Turkish home appliances, and a house that could have been airlifted from Dallas. A Burger Queen and Costa Rica Coffee look oddly familiar.

In a smart restaurant overlooking a go-kart track, lawyers are discussing property deals while western oilmen chat with well-dressed young women. The complex, built only a few years ago, is already scheduled to be demolished to build multimillion-dollar offices for the oil companies that are moving into town in force. Most road signs are trilingual, but some, omitting Arabic, are in English and Kurdish only.
This is the quintessential oil-boom city. The industry’s fickle eye, trained in the late 1990s on Maracaibo, Baku and Luanda, moving at the turn of the century to Moscow and in the late 2000s to Australia’s Darwin, is now turning to Erbil in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

The progress is impressive in what was one of Iraq’s most neglected regions under Saddam Hussein’s government. Yet the sudden accession of oilmoney brings its own problems, with allegations of shady share dealings and corruption.
Jalal Talabani, the Iraqi president who is a Kurd, is proud that the number of millionaires in the city of Sulaymaniyah has increased from 12 to 2,000 since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Other observers are concerned about the entrenchment of patronage politics and the effective duopoly of the two main political parties, Mr Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Massoud Barzani, the Kurdish president. But some government officials argue that the lively opposition party, Goran, has not yet learnt the art of scrutinising legislation effectively and spends too much time on minutiae.

Many Kurds believe they could be making faster progress without the heavy hand of Baghdad, citing restrictions on flights and investments. They believe their suffering during the Anfal genocide of the late 1980s has not been acknowledged.
At the same time, numerous other Iraqis accuse the Kurds of wanting to split Iraq, of aiming to keep the central government weak, and of taking the federal allocation of 17 per cent of revenue while holding on to some of their own earnings. It is likely to remain financially attractive for the Kurds to continue this arrangement rather than going it alone.

The Kurds’ Achilles heel is their dependence on Baghdad to permit oil exports. This was no doubt high on the agenda for Mr Barzani’s visit to Ankara last week.

In the midst of this, international oil companies have a curious role, sometimes as pawns, sometimes as players. They are crucial both to the Kurds’ and central government’s plans to increase oil production.

Erbil has awarded ExxonMobil exploration blocks in areas that are disputed between the Kurds and Baghdad and were subject to ethnic cleansing under Saddam. The central government responded by inviting BP to revive the giant but decrepit Kirkuk field, itself in the disputed region and containing the symbolically important city of Kirkuk.

Kurdistan is pioneering an economic model very different from Baghdad’s statist instincts – focused on attracting foreign investment and building a strong private sector. It is thus an important test case, not only for Iraq but for the region.
It may avoid the worst excesses of crony capitalism, find a modus vivendi with central Iraq, and forge a partnership with Turkey without becoming an economic fiefdom of Ankara.
But, like all oil-rich states, it must resist the temptation to take the easy path, to build flashy Potemkin villages and import luxuries rather than putting in the hard work of establishing a diversified, sustainable economy