Saturday, August 30, 2014

Egypt, today

This is a heart-breaking report on the result of the Arab Spring in Egypt.  Too many brave young ones lost their lives or languish in prisons more horrid than anything in the US, and no redress seems possible.  The US continues to fund the Egyptian military, because, I suppose, it would be worse not to.

The other End of the Newspaper Spoon, indeed.



August 24, 2014


Egypt is witnessing less freedom of expression than under Mubarak or Morsi : John R. Bradley



Egypt’s Only Daily Independent Newspaper In English

Daily News Egypt interviewed Bradley to discuss Egypt’s internal political situation and its foreign affairs, ranging from human rights abuses to the recent geopolitical developments in the region.


John R. Bradley
By Huda Badri and Adham Youssef

 Since the 25 January Revolution in 2011, political unrest has held Egypt in its grip amid rapid regime changes. The ouster of former president Hosni Mubarak was followed by military rule, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, the ascent and ouster of Islamist president Mohamed Morsi and finally the crackdown on the Brotherhood and rise to power of current President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi.

As parliamentary elections are approaching, Egypt is still witnessing a volatile, unstable political and social scene, including threats of militants in the Sinai and western borders with Libya. Also, the regime has been widely criticised by different entities for using excessive force against protesters and civilians as well as launching a mass scale crackdown on political opposition.

John R. Bradley, author and internationally published journalist was one of the few Middle East experts who predicted the massive popular uprising against the Mubarak regime in his book Inside Egypt: The Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of a Revolution, published in 2008. The book discussed political opposition, human rights and security issues in Egypt.

Daily News Egypt interviewed Bradley to discuss Egypt’s internal political situation and its foreign affairs, ranging from human rights abuses to the recent geopolitical developments in the region.


What is your opinion about what is happening now in Egypt after three years from the 25 January Revolution?

One baby step forward, twenty giant tyrannical leaps backwards. Hundreds, if not thousands, of innocent, unarmed Muslim Brotherhood supporters have been murdered in cold blood by the military and security forces – the worst atrocity by the Egyptian state in the country’s modern history.

Even the British occupiers during colonial rule, for all their considerable and unpardonable colonial violence and oppression, were never quite that barbaric in their treatment of the Egyptian masses.

Tens of thousands of men, women and even children – Islamists and secularists alike – have been arrested on the flimsiest of charges, or on no legal basis whatsoever. They languish in Egypt’s prison cells that have once again become notorious torture chambers, and which are run by state-hired thugs who carry out their ghastly deeds with almost complete impunity.

The economy is in tatters as the oligarchy that surrounded former president Hosni Mubarak and the military establishment (that controls about 40% of the economy) reasserted their dominance. But in the real Egypt there is rampant poverty, there are almost unbelievably high crime rates, the education system is on the brink of collapse, and as a result the masses are filled with nothing but a sense of hopelessness and helplessness – to the extent that polls show a growing number wish that the so-called revolution had never happened. They have therefore taken comfort in the tried and tested: military rule.

All this is happening at a time when official censorship has never been so shamelessly and ruthlessly enforced, with the state-run print and broadcast media now so subservient to the new president that it would make one laugh if it were not such a criminal betrayal of their profession – and such an insult to their readers’ and viewers’ intelligence. One gets the feeling that even Al-Sisi, since he’s obviously an intelligent and well-educated individual, might think that such sycophancy is a bit too much.



Human Rights Watch stated that the Rabaa dispersal was a “crime against humanity”. What do you think of this assessment?

Of course it was a crime against humanity. But I have mixed feelings when it comes to NGOs operating in, and reporting on, the internal affairs of other countries. . . .

So, yes, the massacre was a disgrace. But that would better be highlighted by Egyptian-based and Egyptian-staffed NGOs, rather than by foreign groups that have a broader agenda in doing so.



What is your opinion about the situation in Egypt after Al-Sisi became president?

President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi is a curious figure. Unlike Mubarak and his family, Al-Sisi clearly is not personally corrupt. I mean, he is not in it for the money. He demonstrated this by voluntarily cutting his own salary and donating half of his personal wealth to the state. And he’s obviously not a tyrant in the form of Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi – I really do feel that Al-Sisi is probably personally pained by all the bloodshed that has occurred under his rule. I mean, he seems to be acting in the genuine – if misguided – belief that everyone his security forces are killing is a bonafide terrorist. I mean, he’s not the kind of Arab tyrant who would massacre whole sections of his population just for the perverted feeling of power it would momentarily give him.

Nor does he appear aloof and an egomaniac like Mubarak. By all accounts he listens to the advice of those who surround him, although whether it is of any use is another question; and he is fully aware – as he makes clear in his public speeches – of the desperate circumstances faced on a daily basis by the overwhelming majority of Egyptian people. He also has a big advantage in that he is from the military.

The Islamists and secularist opposition may both hate the fact that Egypt has effectively returned to military dictatorship under the veneer of democracy – almost as much as they hate each other. But there is no denying that the military establishment has massive support among ordinary Egyptians, who – in their legendary apathy when it comes to the nitty gritty of party politics – appear to support neither the secularists nor the Islamists.

That makes the probability of another revolutionary uprising in the near future – this time against Al-Sisi – very slim. It would mean the Egyptian masses directly confronting the military, and, while that cannot be ruled out, as things stand I cannot for a second imagine that happening.

Al-Sisi also understands very clearly that it takes years, perhaps decades, to establish a flourishing Western-style democracy, even if we accept (as I do not) that this a viable and worthy goal for a country like Egypt that has its own unique and complex traditions and customs. Believing the opposite was the folly of those who called for the January 25 Revolution, the Westernised elite who naively thought they could change Egypt for the better overnight by having Western-style free-and-fair elections. Well, they lost every single election, and now most of those youth leaders and intellectuals are languishing in prison or have been silenced.

Essentially, what the president is asking for is a period of stability and an end to public demonstrations and endless political infighting so he can get the country back on its feet again. He understands that most Egyptian care most not about human rights and democracy, but rather about being able to work and feed their families. What use are free-and-fair elections every six years if in the meantime your kids are starving to death?

However, there are no quick fixes in this regard, and Al-Sisi’s personal donations in the end amount only to gestures and even, however well-meaning, in many Egyptian opposition activists’ eyes, to a patronising sense of paternalism.

In the meantime, by allowing his security forces to act with such mindless brutality and by silencing all criticism of his rule – and with the strong possibility that he will fail in any significant way to alleviate in the short term the fundamental problems of unemployment and poverty – he risks undermining in the long term the good-will of those who voted for him.

After all, Egyptians have a famous saying: ila el karama! [anything but dignity] Those sycophantic advisers who surround the president, instead of telling him how much the people adore him, should whisper that saying in the president’s ear at every opportunity. It was, in my opinion, a deep sense of a lack of personal dignity that led to the initial revolution.

Don’t you think that there is a contradiction between saying that a violent crackdown took place on peaceful Muslim Brotherhood protesters, and saying that Al-Sisi stepped in to take over for the good of the country?


Of course there is a contradiction, and that’s the root of the problem for those who argue that Egypt is now a democracy.

But there is no contradiction if you subscribe to the false narrative put forward by both the military establishment and the secular/leftist elite – the latter clearly out of touch with the sentiment of the Egyptian masses from the outset.

Remember, the military was initially seen as the saviour of the January 25 Revolution, and were warmly welcomed by the Tahrir demonstrators. They saw a clear distinction between the military establishment and the Mubarak dynasty – with the latter’s vast network of incredibly brutal internal police forces. Anyway, Mubarak hadn’t been active in the military for decades. Nor did his son Gamal, who was poised to succeed Mubarak, have any links to the military.

When the secularists/leftists realised that a military counter-revolution had taken place – the generals basically sacrificed Mubarak in order to retain their own privileges and stop the country from descending into civil war – the locals joined the security forces and military on the streets in pelting the anti-military demonstrators with stones and firebombs.

Al-Sisi believes that the military is destined to have a prominent and permanent role as a force for Egyptian unity and stability, even if he claims it has no direct role in the political running of the country; and since most Egyptians see the military establishment as a force for good, and have fond memories of their time as conscripts (when they lived in an almost parallel world that was not brutal and demeaning as was Egyptian society under Mubarak), that works to Al-Sisi’s advantage.

The regime has presented the peaceful demonstrates as armed terrorists who threaten to drag Egypt into the abyss of armed civil war. In that context, from Al-Sisi’s point of view, they had to eliminate for the good of the country as a whole, and if that means suspended all civil liberties then so be it.

In your opinion, what went wrong for the Muslim Brotherhood to reach to this end?



The Muslim Brotherhood dug its own grave. They committed three main, inter-related mistakes, and by doing so they have no one to blame but themselves for their spectacular fall into political oblivion – and I say that despite condemning in the strongest possible terms the way its peaceful supporters have been massacred and incarcerated.

The first mistake the Muslim Brotherhood made was that they interpreted their electoral victories to mean that they had the overwhelming support of the Egyptian masses. This led them to become arrogant in the belief that they could move swiftly to impose Sharia law, in cahoots with their then Salafi allies.

But elections are complicated events, and to be legitimate they depend on a high turnout of registered voters

Yes, the Muslim Brotherhood won 70 or so percent in most of the elections. But the voter turnout was usually appallingly low – sometimes as little as 25%. Winning 70% of the 25% who turned out actually demonstrated, to anyone who looked at the figures objectively, their lack of popular support. It simply meant that they could only get about 10 to 15% of the total population to vote for them. To put it in a nut shell: the Muslim Brotherhood never managed to galvanise more than their core base, which are – and always have been – a very small minority of the total Egyptian population.

That is why they quickly alienated the great majority of Egyptians, who are by and large a tolerant people – an alienation that led to the June 30 uprising against them.

Egyptians cannot countenance the idea, for example, that their president would call – as Morsi did – for all able-bodied Muslims in the country to join the jihad in Syria, while creating nothing but economic catastrophe in their own country. For ordinary Egyptian Muslims, the idea of travelling to a brotherly Arab country to slaughter its religious minorities is an insane idea, pure and simple. It goes completely against their mindset and historic principle of religious coexistence. Despite what the Islamaphobes in the West say, the overwhelming majority of Egyptian Muslims do not see Christian Egyptians as inferiors, but rather as brothers and sisters in a united nation.

Incidentally, while I haven’t seen any polling data in this regard, I suspect that for this reason most Egyptians, like me, hope that Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad in the end crushes the jihadist maniacs who now call themselves the Islamic State and want to impose what they call Islamic law – that is so strict and barbaric that even Saudi Arabia, of all countries, has now washed its hands of them.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s third mistake was to underestimate the power of what is called the “deep state” – meaning the military establishment, media moguls and the billionaire business elite. I think this so-called “deep state” would have tolerated the Muslim Brotherhood if they had not directly threatened their interests. But when it became clear that Morsi was absolutely determined to radically undermine those interests, for example by threatening to send the traditionally secular Egyptian Army into conflict alongside the jihadists against the secular Syrian regime, the “deep state” mobilised its massive resources in tandem with the masses – and that combination (of self-serving outrage amongst the elite and the acute alienation among the masses) proved fatal – literally so, for thousands of the Muslim Brotherhood’s supporters.

Since 2008, when you published your book, what has differed when it comes to human rights?

Things are as bad as ever, if not worse. And the problem is that now the dream of Western-style democracy has gone up in smoke, the whole issue has been couched in terms of Western interference in internal Egyptian affairs – in the midst of a mindless whipping up of rank anti-foreigner hatred. The new regime has been very clever in, on the one hand, crushing internal dissent, while on the other blaming all criticism on hostile outside powers – using every last ridiculous conspiracy theory it has up its sleeve. With the local press joining in the chorus of anti-foreigner abuse, coupled with its failure (compared to under Mubarak’s rule) to try to hold the regime to account when it comes to human rights abuses or anything else, the security forces seem to have a green light to do what the hell they like.

What do you think of the vicious war taking place now in Sinai? Does the lack of media coverage concerns you?

The war in Sinai is obviously different to the so-called war on the Muslim Brotherhood. In Sinai, those fighting the regime are undeniably jihadist terrorists who murder indiscriminately and want to overthrow the current regime through violence to create a strict Islamic state.

The Egyptian government has no option but to try to eliminate every last one of them, because violence is all they understand – and, believing that God is on their side, they will not end their so-called jihad until they are either murdered, captured or achieve their goal. I think there are a number of reasons why this is not getting the international attention it deserves.

For a start, the Egyptian government will not allow journalists to work freely in the region, so how are they supposed to report on what’s going on there? It’s also a very complex situation, having its roots in a sense of alienation felt by the local Bedouin tribes. The Western media doesn’t like complicated narratives; it prefers articles that pitch goodies against baddies.

Also, there’s so much mayhem in this world at the moment and there’s only so much the Western press can focus on. So you tend to see the region reported on only when the jihadist nutcases launch attacks against foreign tourists, which obviously makes for eye-catching, sensationalist headlines in the Western press because it’s something that Westerners who holiday in Egypt can directly relate to.

With putting the status of journalists in mind, how do you see freedom of speech now in Egypt?

As I pointed out earlier, there is no freedom of expression in Egypt now in any meaningful sense of the term. Let me give a brief account of my own personal experience – not as a crude form of self promotion, but in order to justify that bold statement.

When my book Inside Egypt: The Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of a Revolution was published in 2008, it was initially banned by the Mubarak regime. But at the time there was a very vibrant and feisty opposition press, and they came out very strongly in my defence and against the decision to ban the book. For almost a month, my photograph and the cover of the book was featured in articles and accompanying lengthy interviews with me – inAl-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Dostour and countless other newspapers and magazines, often on the front pages.

Eventually, the Mubarak regime rescinded its ban. But it did so under pressure from the – at the time – courageous Egyptian opposition media, not from the West. And I am certain of this that because no articles appeared in Britain or America about the initial book ban – apart from a few little dispatches from AP and AFP.

Moreover, when the Muslim Brotherhood was in power, a prestigious Cairo-based publishing house published an Arabic translation of Inside Egypt and, shortly afterwards, an Arabic-translation of my latest book After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts (2012) with an new introduction aimed at Arabic-language readers. After the Arab Spring is basically a ferocious polemic against the Muslim Brotherhood and everything they stand for, just as Inside Egypt has a chapter very critical of them. I call them, very frankly, fascists and hypocrites, an opinion I continue to hold.

However, the Morsi regime, for all its considerable faults, did not ban either book – indeed, After the Arab Spring received as many reviews in Egypt as had Inside Egypt, including a full-page positive feature in the state-controlled Al-Ahram (which at the time was broadly supportive of Morsi). At the time, both books were in their window displays of all the bookshops I walked past in Cairo. And I felt at ease living in Egypt at the time –as much as anyone could during the continuing mayhem – just as I had during Mubarak’s rule even during all the fuss over Inside Egypt.

Now, imagine for a moment that I was about to publish a new book about Egypt under Al-Sisi’s rule, detailing in a similarly anecdotal manner all the outrageous human rights abuses his regime has committed. As it happens, I have no plan to do so – I can’t see the point in writing more than one book on a single country. But if I was planning on doing so, do you think the Al-Sisi regime goons would hesitate for a moment before banning it, then arresting me, torturing me and sending me to one its ridiculous kangaroo courts, with accusations that I was an Israeli spy or in collusion with Islamist terrorists or some other such nonsense? And if that were to happen, the so-called opposition and independent Arabic-language newspapers – the ones that gave me their full support during the Inside Egypt hoo-haa – would, of course, do their utmost to justify the resulting nightmarish show-trial.

The point here is not about me, but to illustrate that there is less freedom of expression in Egypt these days than under either the Mubarak or the Morsi regimes – both for foreigners and locals. The fact that a writer as courageous and principled as Alaa Al-Aswany, who is an Egyptian national treasure, has taken a vow of silence tells us all we need to know about how intellectual figures are facing what could justifiably described as a fanatical assault by the idiots now in control of the Ministry of Information and their lackeys who edit the state and most of the now not-so-independent media. The latter are nothing more than what some wit has termed “presstitutes” for their equivalents in the Western media.

Some experts may argue that the “security solution” may give a rise to a new wave of extremism. Do you have any comment on that?

Al-Sisi is apparently the most popular Egyptian leader since Gamal Abdel Nasser, who with his fellow Free Officers seized power in 1952 and established the military dictatorship from which Al-Sisi hails. Like Nasser, Al-Sisi has shut down the free media, outlawed the political opposition, encouraged mindless xenophobia and banned all criticism of himself and his policies. Especially targeted, as they were during Nasser’s rule, are the Islamist critics, against whom – as we have said – he has launched a ferocious crackdown.

But Nasser’s own legacy shows that any Egyptian president puts his country’s long-term stability in grave danger by resorting to such brutal repression, especially against the Islamist minority. Nasser, you will recall, similarly suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood, and the result was a jihadist blowback that began in the early 1970s and lasted three decades. Alas, most Egyptians, like Al-Sisi, appear more concerned with evoking the imagined glories of a more dignified, Nasser-dominated past, in order to forget the dismal present, than learning from this dark earlier period of Egypt’s history.

Sooner or later the Muslim Brotherhood will, once again, have to be incorporated in some form or other into the political process if stability is to be restored. Some Egyptian officials have already hinted that this could take place. Like them or loathe them, the Muslim Brotherhood have been around for a century and represent a strong if minority voice in Egyptian society.

The only alternative would be to kill or imprison them all, which is sheer madness as a political strategy. It will only encourage their supporters to join the more extremist groups.

How do you see the scene after the Arab revolutions of the Arab Spring? And what about the role the Western powers played during the last period?

The decision by the Western powers, along with its allies Qatar and Saudi Arabia, to train, fund and arm the jihadists fighting to topple President Al-Assad was the most insane and inexcusable imperial foreign policy blunder since the decision by Britain, France and Israel to try to take over the Suez Canal in 1956.

The idea was that the “moderate” and Western-friendly Islamists would take over Syria, thus weakening Iran and Hezbollah. This was done with the aim, firstly, of furthering the ambitions of right-wing in Israel, which obviously wants Hezbollah eradicated and at the same time sees a potentially nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat to its existence; but it was also done to empower key Western ally Saudi Arabia, which – for no reason other than anti-Shi’a bigotry – wants to see Iran contained and weakened.

Well, it all backfired, the Saudis lost control of their jihadist foot soldiers, and now the Islamic State is calling not only for the destruction of Israel but the overthrow of the Saudi regime too. And, contrary to popular myth and the hopes of Washington, London and Tel Aviv, ordinary Syrians did not rise up against President Al-Assad.

So now we have a clearly defined battle line. On the one side are Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the other oil monarchies, Israel, the moderate Palestinian factions and the West – all of whom have a shared interest in ensuring that the Islamic State is crushed. On the other side are Qatar, Hamas, Turkey and the Islamic State itself – all of whom are determined to back, albeit in different ways and at their own singular pace, the new so-called Caliphate.

The country everyone should be watching very closely is Saudi Arabia [Emphasis added.]. I lived there for a number of years, and published a book on the country calledSaudi Arabia Exposed: Inside a Kingdom in Crisis (2005). If it was in a state of crisis then, it is now ripe for a popular revolution.

If the House of Saud falls, it would mean not only unimaginable inter-tribal and sectarian bloodshed inside the Wahhabi kingdom itself, but also the Islamic State moving to take control of Mecca and Medina. So, although it almost makes one vomit to say it, one must admit that the Saudi royal family is the best option for that country, at least in the short term. Its fall would also mean the almost immediate subsequent overthrow of the ruling regimes in the Saudi client states of Bahrain (which is majority Shi’a but ruled over by a Sunni ruling family) and Jordan (whose population is mostly of Palestinian origin and where the only opposition is the Muslim Brotherhood). That would mean Iran moving into Bahrain and the Islamic State into Jordan. No one in their right mind wants either scenario to become a reality.

The fall of the House of Saud would also have terrible consequences for Egypt specifically, since it is aid from the Saudi royal family, and remittances from Egyptian expatriate workers in Saudi Arabia, that is essential in the short term to keeping the Egyptian economy from total implosion.

As for the more general role of the West in all this, as you can imagine, despite all its empty talk about promoting human rights and democracy, Washington will do absolutely everything in its power to keep the Saudi king on the throne, while Western-allied Arab states will continue their pressure on Qatar to stop funding the Islamist terrorists.

And so long as Al-Sisi maintains the peace treaty with Israel, keeps the Suez Canal open, maintains close ties with Saudi Arabia and continues his “war on terror”, his regime thugs will be free to commit however many human rights abuses they want to – without fear of any serious repercussions from the West.

Some might argue that the Islamic State (IS) is a creation of the West. How reasonable is this assessment?

There’s no doubt that the Islamic State is a creation of the West. That much we can take for granted. But the real question is: was this done by design or by sheer stupidity?

Those who argue that there is a method to the West’s madness claim that it’s all part of a project to “Balkanise” the region – to use Bernard Lewis’ famous term. Their aim is to weaken strong states that are hostile to the West in order to steal their oil reserves and weaken Israel’s enemies. This has clearly been the intention of the Neocons [Neoconservatives] and Likudiks [Likud affiliated member] since the invasion of Iraq. But I really don’t think there was a well-thought out plan to create the Islamic State. Even the neocons are not that insane.

Rather, it’s yet another case of the West fooling itself into thinking that it can hire jihadists to do its dirty work for them – meaning in this case overthrowing the Syrian regime, and thus establish a “moderate” pro-Western regime in Damascus while by default weakening Iran and Hezbollah – all with the hope of keeping them onside in the long term. Obviously, they have learned nothing from the experience of Afghanistan, whose mujahadeenwere armed, funded and trained by the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and then moved into the West’s Enemy Number 1: the Taliban. Or, more recently, from the experience of Libya, where NATO aided the radical jihadists who turned on their Western backers within months of Gaddafi’s assassination.

So, no, I think it’s more a case of ignorance, inhumanity and wishful thinking on the part of the dimwits who run the West’s strategy in the Middle East from Washington and London than some great conspiracy to impose a mediaeval-style Caliphate that will serve their imperial interests. After all, the Islamic State serves nobody’s interest but its own.

∼∼∼∼∼∼∼∼∼∼∼∼∼∼∼
IN MEMORIAM
brave young dreamers

may you never die
                                      out.



Wahhabism reaches the heart of Russia

A look at Turkey's relations with ISIS is here, and one report was not encouraging.  The RIA report below suggests that the US and Russia have a common interest in opposing all Salafist gropes, including ISIS, in Syria and Iraq.  Russia is already sending bombers to the Iraqi central government, and technicians to teach Iraqis how to use them

Tell why the US media doesn't report on US -Russia commodity nearly ass much as it reports on the differences in Ukraine.

Russia should be invited to join Europe.  Ethnic Russians think of themselves as European..  If the EU cooperates with Russia to modify internal obstacles to joining the EU as it worked with Turkey, the World would be a better place.

Tuva won't care, one way or the other.

Emphasis in italics and images are added.





Russian security forces conducting anti-terrorist operation


MOSCOW, August 29 (RIA Novosti) - Since the early 1990s radical Islam was one of Russia’s most serious security threats, spreading across its regions and attracting more and more Jihadi followers.
According to political scientist Igor Dobaev, the Islamic radicalization process is an ongoing one; it is expanding its influence to new regions and has led to a growing number of radical groups. While the North Caucasus remains a hotbed for Jihadi activity, Islamic extremism has also strengthened its positions in the Volga region and in larger cities of central Russia.

 
Note that the region extends into the Caucasus.

And see Springtime of Nation, a spritely, deadly serious blog  that describes itself thusly:  


An irreverent, informative blog about separatism, autonomy, indigenous rights, interethnic conflict, balkanization, and micronationalism—with maps & flags in every article!  

Living in Russia today would be interesting and lively and not safe.

The Volga region, especially the Republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan experienced an Islamic revival in the early 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union. 


The growth of Islam has inspired a rise in extremism. A considerable number of Muslims had an opportunity to study Islam abroad, where they were radicalized and became advocates of Jihad, or holy warfare. After returning home, they attempted to proselytize the Islamist religious trend and attract new followers. The situation was also “heated up” by the Caucasian jihadists, who launched information campaigns, appealing for armed resistance  With more than 12 million Muslims living within these republics and in their neighboring areas, radical Islam had every opportunity to spread quickly throughout the population.
As CSIS informs, the first terrorist attacks on Islamic religious leaders from the Republic of Tatarstan took place in July 2012. Three months later, Russian security forces prevented an extensive act of terrorism in Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan.

What is troubling is that the radical ideology is becoming more attractive to ethnic Russians who live in central regions. The media often uses the term “Russian Wahhabism” to refer to former Orthodox Christians who have adopted radical Islam and participate in terrorist activities. [Note:  is it as if Texas Christians were to begin to adoptee Wahhabism?]  The phenomenon of “Russian Wahhabism” represents a new challenge for Russia’s security forces, since it makes the prevention of terrorism acts and the detection of potential criminals more and more complicated.


Images of Republic of Tatarstan (few people shown)










and Bashkortostan









SOME DAY I'LL LEARN WHAT THIS IS ABOUT.







Friday, August 29, 2014

The Saud Family, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and all the ret of us

Thanks, Rik, for this and the previous Times article.

There follows a good history of the Saud family, from its rise to riches and its fateful tie, in 1744, to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of "Wahhabism,"

A current manifestation of that political-religious union is the UAE's bombing of Muslims who are not adherents of Wahhabism, in Libya.

When the Arabs feel strong enough to bomb fellow Muslims, more virulent attacks on Israel and Hamas, and on the West and its values of democracy and the Rule of Law seem immanent. 

Wahhabism has a fixation on Jews and Christians.  Wahhabi Muslims don't seem to be concerned with Chinese atheists, Indian Hindus, Tuva shamans or any of the world's many other people, but only those in the Abrahamic tradition.


Obama is correct to be concerned with ISIS and he other Salafist rebels in Syria, Salafism is Wahhabism writ large (and poetic justice if the Saudi creation, ISIS, were to overtake Mecca).

Russia and Turkey have the best rained, best equipped, and largest land armies in Central Asia, and both have an interest in ending Wahhabism, though neither admits it, yet.  Neither is dependent on the Saudi for oil. Is Obama making agreements with them as we ponder what to do?  I'd bet on it.

On reflection, the Royal Family, for all its faults, seems reasonable, compared to the fundamentalists the Family is beholden too.


From PBS's Frontline:



1744  The Holy Alliance

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of "Wahhabism," an austere form of Islam, arrives in the central Arabian state of Najd in 1744 preaching a return to "pure" Islam. He seeks protection from the local emir, Muhammad ibn Saud, head of the Al Saud tribal family, and they cut a deal. The Al Saud will endorse al-Wahhab's austere form of Islam and in return, the Al Saud will get political legitimacy and regular tithes from al-Wahhab's followers. The religious-political alliance that al-Wahhab and Saud forge endures to this day in Saudi Arabia.

By the 19th century, the Al Saud has spread its influence across the Arabian Peninsula, stretching from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf and including the Two Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. But in 1818, forces of the Ottoman Empire sack the capital, Riyadh, and execute many of the religious and political leaders. Over the next eighty years the Al Saud attempt to reestablish their rule on the Arabian Peninsula without success.

| Explore more about Wahhabism, in this section of FRONTLINE's 2001 report, "Saudi Time Bomb?".


1902
Abd al-Aziz and the Ikhwan
The Ikhwan


In 1902, a direct descendent of Muhammad ibn Saud, twenty-year-old Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, rides out of the desert with 60 of his brothers and cousins to restore the rule of Al Saud. He captures Riyadh, the ancient capital of the Saudi kingdom, but to conquer all of the Arabian Peninsula, he seeks the help of nomadic Bedouins, the Ikhwan, or Muslim brothers. Renowned warriors, the Ikhwan are also fervent Wahhabi Islamic puritans who want to spread their form of Islam throughout the Middle East.


1924-25
Abd al-Aziz Captures Mecca and Medina, Crushes the Ikhwan

With the Ikhwan by his side, Abd al-Aziz captures province after province of the vast desert. He captures Mecca in 1924 and Medina in 1925, becoming the ruler of the Two Holy Cities of Islam. But the Ikhwan want to spread Wahhabism beyond Arabia and when Abd al-Aziz tries to restrain them, they rebel. To survive, Abd al-Aziz realizes he has to destroy the Ikhwan. But how can he, a defender of Islam, justify going to war against his Muslim warriors?

Abd al-Aziz seeks the approval of the ulama, the religious authorities, regarded as the moral guardians of the realm. With the ulama's endorsement, he crushes the Ikhwan.


1932
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud declares himself king and gives his name to the country: Saudi Arabia. To keep his new kingdom united, he marries a daughter from every tribe as well as from the influential clerical families -- more than twenty wives, although never more than four at one time, in accordance with the Quran.

These unions produce 45 legitimate sons and an unknown number of daughters (daughters are not counted). Abd al-Aziz then begins consolidating power away from the brothers and cousins who helped him conquer the peninsula in favor of his own sons. Every Saudi king since has been a son of Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud.

 * * *

1933
Oil!

Saudi Arabia and the U.S. establish diplomatic relations, and in 1933 the first foreign oil prospectors arrive in the kingdom. The Americans pay $170,000 in gold for land concessions that turn out to contain the biggest oil fields on earth. Ignoring criticism that inviting foreigners into the kingdom is un-Islamic, and citing precedent in the Quran, King Abd al-Aziz invites U.S oil companies to develop Saudi oil resources. The oil companies and the Saudi government set up a joint enterprise that later becomes the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). Its shareholders include America's four largest oil corporations.


1945
The Oil-for-Security Deal
FDR and King Abd al-Aziz aboard the U.S.S. Quincy


By 1945, the U.S. urgently needs oil facilities to help supply forces fighting in the Second World War. Meanwhile, security is at the forefront of King Abd al-Aziz's concerns. President Franklin Roosevelt invites the king to meet him aboard the U.S.S. Quincy, docked in the Suez Canal. The two leaders cement a secret oil-for-security pact: The king guarantees to give the U.S. secure access to Saudi oil and in exchange the U.S. will provide military assistance and training to Saudi Arabia and build the Dhahran military base.

Also discussed at the meeting is the issue of creating a Jewish homeland in Palestine. King Abd al-Aziz acknowledges the plight of the Jews, but argues taking part of Palestine is unfair to the Palestinians. In a letter to the king that Roosevelt sends after their meeting, the president writes: "I will take no action which might prove hostile to the Arab people." But Roosevelt dies shortly after sending this letter and Vice President Harry Truman becomes president.


1947
U.S. Recognizes the State of Israel

Prince Faisal, the King's second son, arrives in New York for the UN vote on the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. The Saudis are dead set against it. Prince Faisal is promised by Gen. George Marshall, one of President Truman's top aides, that the U.S. will vote against the proposal. When Truman decides to support Palestine's partition, Prince Faisal takes this as a personal affront.

In 1948, King Abd al-Aziz sends Saudi forces to join an unsuccessful effort to destroy the nascent Jewish state. Saudi Arabia has since never officially recognized Israel, and is technically still at war with it.


1953
Prince Saud Becomes King

Before his death in 1953, King Abd al-Aziz designates his eldest son, Prince Saud, the next king and appoints his second son, Prince Faisal, minister of foreign affairs. But Prince Saud will prove an ineffective ruler. His reign will be marked by inattention to governance and misuse of money.


1957
Reinforcing the U.S.-Saudi Alliance

The Middle East balance of power shifts after Gamal Abdel Nasser's overthrow of Egypt's king in 1952. Nasser proclaims himself a pan-Arabist -- a secular, socialist -- and allies himself with the Soviet Union against the West. Nasser also wants Saudi oil under his control, saying it belongs to all Arab people.

King Saud visits the U.S.


The U.S. moves to shore up support for Saud. President Eisenhower invites him for a state visit in Feb. 1957. Eisenhower wants to renew the lease on the Dhahran airbase, a useful strategic asset in the Cold War. Saud wants the money that the U.S. will pay to extend the lease. And he privately promises to suspend all aid to Egypt. To this day, the agreement that Faisal and Eisenhower sign constitutes the basis of U.S.-Saudi military cooperation.

But Saud soon spends the revenues from the Dhahran lease on luxury trips to Europe and falls out of favor with his own family.


1958-59
The "Free Prince" Movement

In the late 50s, one of King Abd al-Aziz's younger sons, Prince Talal, begins a movement for political reform in the kingdom. In 1958, he drafts a new Saudi constitution to establish a national consultative council, a first step toward establishing a constitutional monarchy. But his proposal is rejected by King Saud and in 1961 he is forced from his position as transportation minister.

From exile in Egypt and Lebanon, Prince Talal announces the establishment of a royal opposition group comprised of some of his full brothers and other well-educated Saudis. It is nicknamed the "Free Princes." They continue to lobby for political reform, but without success.


1964
King Saud Deposed

By the early 60s, King Saud is losing support everywhere and has brought the country to the brink of economic collapse. The senior Al Saud brothers realize something has to be done and arrive at a consensus to replace Saud with a more capable leader. They go to the ulama, the religious authorities, and get a fatwa sanctioning Saud's abdication in favor of his half-brother Faisal. King Saud and his entourage quietly leave the country, and the ailing monarch spends his last years exiled in Athens, Greece, where he dies in 1969.


1964-75
Faisal's Modernization

King Faisal begins a program of bringing the kingdom up to date, stressing economic development and educational improvements. During his reign oil revenues increase by more than 1,600 percent, enabling Faisal to build a communications and transportation infrastructure and set up a generous system of welfare benefits for all citizens. Even today, Saudi citizens do not pay taxes.

An early Arabic television station


But almost every aspect of modernization brings the king into conflict with the religious establishment. For the ulama, innovation threatens Islam. To appease the conservatives, King Faisal allows Saudia Arabia to become a sanctuary for extremist Muslims from Egypt and Syria where the governments are cracking down on fundamentalist scholars and professionals. Faisal invites them to teach Saudi Arabia's youth. His decision will have far-reaching consequences; many of today's Saudi radicals studied under Egyptian and Syrian fundamentalists.

Partly due to his standing as a pious Muslim, Faisal is able to introduce cautious social reforms such as female education. In 1965, he approves the first television broadcast inside the kingdom -- a recitation of the Quran. Nonetheless, religious conservatives stage a large protest. When a nephew of the king is killed at the protest in clashes with the police, the king does nothing to punish the policemen. This decision will later have disastrous consequences.


1967
The Arab-Israeli War

In the spring of 1967 war is brewing. President Nasser of Egypt moves troops to Israel's border and orders the UN out. Uniting against Israel, Faisal reconciles with Nasser. Fearing an attack is imminent, Israel launches a massive pre-emptive war. In just six days the bulk of Arab armies are destroyed and Arab leaders are humiliated. At Aramco's compounds, hundreds of Saudis riot against the United States. The Arab league pressures King Faisal to use Saudi oil as a weapon against the West.


1973
The Arab Oil Embargo
Long lines and oil shortages


In Oct. 1973, another Arab-Israeli war breaks out. Despite growing tensions, the Arab attack on Israel comes as a surprise. In the first day, Egyptian and Syrian armies gain considerable ground.

In the midst of the war, the U.S. airlifts supplies to Israel. The Arab League pressures Faisal for an oil boycott and Faisal acts, ordering Aramco to stop pumping. With Saudi oil kept off the market, world oil prices quadruple. President Nixon sends Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on an urgent mission to meet with Faisal. The Pentagon begins considering military options. Kissinger says oil is a national security priority, and if necessary, the U.S. will intervene militarily.

With the oil embargo having a major impact on the war in Vietnam, a secret solution is devised: King Faisal agrees to arrange for Saudi oil to be covertly supplied to the U.S. Navy. The oil embargo officially ends in 1974.


1975
Faisal Assassinated

On the morning of March 25, King Faisal's past catches up with him. At a meeting with Kuwait's petroleum minister, one of the king's nephews, Faisal ibn Musaid, slips into the room. His brother had been killed by police at the 1965 protest against the introduction of television. Ibn Musaid shoots and kills the king. The assassination comes as a violent shock, especially because the killer is a member of the royal family.

As his father had decreed, King Faisal is succeeded by his half-brother Prince Khalid, who becomes the fourth king of Saudi Arabia.


1975-1979
The Oil Boom Years

During the reign of King Khalid, hundreds of billions in oil revenue pours into Saudi Arabia. The tiny population, estimated at four million and with only half a million literate males, finds it hard to absorb such wealth. The government begins a frenzied pace of buying and building. Foreign contractors flood in. Among those accumulating massive riches during these years are the bin Ladens, principal builders for the Al Saud royal family.

The boom also leads to widespread official corruption. Deals are riddled with influence peddling, bribes and oversize commissions. The Saudi royals, with their huge allowances, become notorious big spenders in Europe's casinos. Saudi leaders lose the credibility and respect of the country's religious conservatives.


1979
Armed Zealots Seize the Great Mosque at Mecca
The Great Mosque at Mecca


One of Saudi Arabia's most shocking events occurs the morning of November 20, 1979. Several hundred Saudi fundamentalists take over al-Haram, the Great Mosque at Mecca and the holiest site in Islam. The leader of the insurgents is Juhayman al-Utaybi, a direct descendant of the Ikhwan, the Wahhabi warriors who helped the Al Saud family take power in the early 1920s.

The radicals call for a return to pure Islam, and a reversal of modernization. Juhayman also accuses the royal family of corruption and says they have lost their legitimacy because of their dealings with the West.

The royal family again turns to the ulama, the religious leaders of Saudi Arabia, and the clerics issue a fatwa based on verses from the Quran that allows the government to use all necessary force to retake the Great Mosque. The standoff lasts for several weeks before the Saudi military can remove the insurgents. More than 200 troops and dissidents are killed in the attacks and, to set an example, over sixty of the zealots are publicly beheaded in their hometowns.


1979
The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, the Rise of Jihadis

Shaken by the seizure of the Great Mosque by radical fundamentalists, the royal family moves to increase its religious standing and starts implementing a more Islamist agenda. They begin pumping millions into religious education under the ulama. Saudi charities raise even more. New theological schools and universities are built to produce large numbers of clerics who teach Wahhabism as the only true form of Islam and preach jihad against infidels is the obligation of every true believer.

This same year, the Wahhabis find a rallying cause like no other: The Soviet Union, the godless Communist power, invades the Muslim nation of Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia and the U.S. make a secret deal to contribute equal amounts to finance the Afghan war against the Soviets.

Thousands of young Saudis are sent to fight alongside the mujahideen in Afghanistan For the next decade, some 45,000 young Saudi volunteers will trek to Afghanistan where they acquire military skills and come to believe that dedicated Islamic fighters can defeat a superpower. One of their leaders is Osama bin Laden.


Late-70s and early-80s
Military and Security Build-Up

In the wake of Ayatollah Khomeini's bitterly anti-American Shi'a fundamentalist revolution in Iran and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia strengthen their security relationship. Rising oil revenues allow the Saudis to increase military expenditures at all levels.


1982
Fahd's Reign and the Iran-Iraq War

King Kahlid dies after a short illness and is succeeded by his half-brother Crown Prince Fahd. The new king will face economic constraints as oil prices decline in the late 80s.

Saddam Hussein and King Fahd


Just as Fahd takes power, war breaks out between his two powerful neighbors, Iran and Iraq. Fahd befriends Saddam Hussein, a fellow Sunni, and gives him money and weapons to battle the Shi'a in Iran. But two years after the war ends, Saddam will invade neighboring Kuwait, with his eye on Saudi oil.


1990-91
The Gulf War

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invades Kuwait, and moves its troops toward the border of Saudi Arabia. Osama bin Laden visits members of the royal family and offers his Afghan-trained mujahideen to help fight Iraq, but they don't take his offer seriously.

King Fahd turns to his U.S. allies for help. But can he, the Defender of the Two Mosques of Mecca and Medina, invite hundreds of thousands of non-Muslim "infidel" troops into the kingdom? Once again, the royal family turns to the ulama for a ruling or fatwa. With their approval, over half a million U.S. troops arrive in Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries.


1991
Saudi Women Demonstrate for the Right to Drive
Saudi women driving during the protest


With U.S. women soldiers in many parts of the kingdom because of the Gulf War, Saudi women decide to challenge restrictions on their rights, including the right to drive. In November,forty-seven Saudi women meet at the parking lot of a Safeway and drive their cars through the streets of Riyadh. The women are arrested by the religious police, but released the same night under orders of Prince Salman, the governor of Riyadh.

The ulama calls their driving a depravity and issues the names and numbers of all 47 women, urging clerics to punish the women as they see fit. The Al Saud royal family publicly reasserts the ban on women drivers.


1992
Religious Leaders Criticize King Fahd

A group of 107 Wahhabi religious figures sends a 46-page "Memorandum of Advice" to King Fahd criticizing the government for corruption and human rights abuses and for allowing U.S. troops on Saudi soil. The document calls on the government to more strictly follow shari'a, or Islamic law, and end relations with Western governments. King Fahd dismisses seven of the 17 members of the ulama for refusing to denounce the memorandum.


1992
Fahd Introduces the "Basic Law of Government"

Amid calls for democratic reform, King Fahd introduces the "Basic Law of Government," essentially the country's first written constitution. The first of the laws specifies that Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with a monarchy headed by the House of Saud. The Al Saud's control of government remains tight, but the new laws make some concessions to reformers. For example, a Consultative Council of 60 members appointed by the king is created to interpret laws and make recommendations on matters of state. The laws also establish the first municipal governments in the country.


1994
Anti-Monarchy Protests

Following the government's arrest of two Wahhabi clerics for anti-government preaching, several thousand protestors stage demonstrations in the town of Buraida. The clerics accuse the monarchy of corruption and betraying Islam by allowing U.S. troops on the Arabian Peninsula. The government admits to arresting over a hundred protestors; opposition groups claim thousands were seized.

The incident ends up forcing the government to cede more control to the Wahhabi clerics, but only if the clerics promise to support the government. The two Wahhabi clerics are quietly released from prison in 1999.


1995
Americans Targeted

Four years after the Gulf War, U.S. troops are still in the kingdom. Osama bin Laden seizes on the issue and his followers go on the offensive. On the morning of November 13, 1995 a massive bomb shakes the U.S.-operated Saudi National Guard training center in Riyadh. Five American military contractors and one U.S. soldier are killed. Those arrested say they are inspired by bin Laden.


1995-96
King Fahd Incapacitated

Following a series of strokes in 1995 and 1996, King Fahd is no longer able to run the government and Crown Prince Abdullah, Fahd's half brother, becomes the kingdom's de facto ruler.


June 1996
Khobar Towers Bombing

On the morning of June 25,1996 a large truck bomb explodes at the U.S. military residence in Dhahran called Khobar Towers, killing 19 U.S. servicemen. U.S. law enforcement efforts to investigate the bombing are met with resistance by Saudi officials. Five years later, a federal grand jury will indict 13 Saudis and one Lebanese man for the attack.


1996

Bin Laden Declares War on America

In his 1996 declaration of war against the Americans occupying the lands of the Two Holy Places, Osama bin Laden calls on Muslims everywhere to fight the Jews and crusaders. He also accuses the Saudi royal family of pocketing the national wealth.


Late 1990s
The Rise of Arab Media

Arab satellite television begins broadcasting throughout the region, beyond the control of the Saudi monarchy. For the first time, Saudi citizens see for themselves reports of their country's shortcomings: the lack of civil rights, political freedoms, royal corruption. Disturbing images of the Arab-Israeli conflict become part of Saudis' daily viewing.

Throughout the 90s, U.S. efforts to forge a lasting peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are unsuccessful. When the Saudis sense that the new U.S. president, George W. Bush, might abandon the peace process, they decide to take a more active role.


August 2001
Crown Prince Abdullah's Letter

Frustrated by what he sees as a continuing pro-Israeli bias by the Bush administration and its predecessors, Crown Prince Abdullah sends an angry letter to President Bush on August 29, stating that if the U.S. does not behave in a more equitable manner toward the Palestinians, the Saudis will have to reconsider their long-standing alliance with the U.S. But before any measurable action can be taken on his complaint, the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 occur.


September 11, 2001
The Saudi Response

At the official level, the Saudi government is appalled by the terrorist attacks in the U.S. and publishes a statement calling them "regrettable" and "inhuman." Although it is known almost immediately that 15 of the 19 hijackers in the Al Qaeda plot are Saudi citizens, months pass before the Saudi government will admit it.

America's subsequent war on terror in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda deeply divides Saudis. But Saudi leaders quietly allow the U.S. military to use Saudi air bases for command and control operations.

Saudi militants captured in Afghanistan will make up the biggest segment of the population shipped to the prison camps in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.


April 2003
U.S. Forces Leave the Kingdom

Just days after Baghdad falls to U.S. forces in Iraq, U.S.Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld arrives in Riyadh to announce that U.S. troops will pull out of Saudi air bases. For more than ten years, the American presence in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques has been a rallying cry for Al Qaeda.


May 2003
The Wake-Up Call
Destruction from the attacks in Riyadh


The fact that U.S. troops are withdrawing from the kingdom makes no difference to Al Qaeda. On May 12, 2003 Al Qaeda militants attack three compounds in Riyadh that house hundreds of foreign workers. Thirty-five people are killed, including nine Americans. Over one hundred are wounded. Shocked, Saudi society and the royal family begin to look inward and to question how their own citizens could have been behind the attacks.

Tuesday, August 26, 2014

ISIS Atrocities Started With Saudi Support for Salafi Hate

What I said on August 17, but it looks more credible when said by a staff member of the Council on Foreign Relations, in the New York Times:


New York Times

Saudis Must Stop Exporting Extremism
ISIS Atrocities Started With Saudi Support for Salafi Hate

By ED HUSAINAUG. 22, 2014


ALONG with a billion Muslims across the globe, I turn to Mecca in Saudi Arabia every day to say my prayers. But when I visit the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, the resting place of the Prophet Muhammad, I am forced to leave overwhelmed with anguish at the power of extremism running amok in Islam’s birthplace. Non-Muslims are forbidden to enter this part of the kingdom, so there is no international scrutiny of the ideas and practices that affect the 13 million Muslims who visit each year.

Last week, Saudi Arabia donated $100 million to the United Nations to fund a counterterrorism agency. This was a welcome contribution, but last year, Saudi Arabia rejected a rotating seat on the United Nations Security Council. This half-in, half-out posture of the Saudi kingdom is a reflection of its inner paralysis in dealing with Sunni Islamist radicalism: It wants to stop violence, but will not address the Salafism that helps justify it.

Let’s be clear: Al Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram, the Shabab and others are all violent Sunni Salafi groupings. For five decades, Saudi Arabia has been the official sponsor of Sunni Salafism across the globe.

Most Sunni Muslims around the world, approximately 90 percent of the Muslim population, are not Salafis. Salafism is seen as too rigid, too literalist, too detached from mainstream Islam. While Shiite and other denominations account for 10 percent of the total, Salafi adherents and other fundamentalists represent 3 percent of the world’s Muslims.

Unlike a majority of Sunnis, Salafis are evangelicals who wish to convert Muslims and others to their “purer” form of Islam — unpolluted, as they see it, by modernity. In this effort, they have been lavishly supported by the Saudi government, which has appointed emissaries to its embassies in Muslim countries who proselytize for Salafism. The kingdom also grants compliant imams V.I.P. access for the annual hajj, and bankrolls ultraconservative Islamic organizations like the Muslim World League and World Assembly of Muslim Youth.

After 9/11, under American pressure, much of this global financial support dried up, but the bastion of Salafism remains strong in the kingdom, enforcing the hard-line application of outdated Shariah punishments long abandoned by a majority of Muslims. Just since Aug. 4, 19 people have been beheaded in Saudi Arabia, nearly half for nonviolent crimes.

We are rightly outraged at the beheading of James Foley by Islamist militants, and by ISIS’ other atrocities, but we overlook the public executions by beheading permitted by Saudi Arabia. By licensing such barbarity, the kingdom normalizes and indirectly encourages such punishments elsewhere. When the country that does so is the birthplace of Islam, that message resonates.

I lived in Saudi Arabia’s most liberal city, Jidda, in 2005. That year, in an effort to open closed Saudi Salafi minds, King Abdullah supported dialogue with people of other religions. In my mosque, the cleric used his Friday Prayer sermon to prohibit such dialogue on grounds that it put Islam on a par with “false religions.” It was a slippery slope to freedom, democracy and gender equality, he argued — corrupt practices of the infidel West.

This tension between the king and Salafi clerics is at the heart of Saudi Arabia’s inability to reform. The king is a modernizer, but he and his advisers do not wish to disturb the 270-year-old tribal pact between the House of Saud and the founder of Wahhabism (an austere form of Islam close to Salafism). That 1744 desert treaty must now be nullified.

The influence that clerics wield is unrivaled. Even Saudis’ Twitter heroes are religious figures: An extremist cleric like Muhammad al-Arifi, who was banned last year from the European Union for advocating wife-beating and hatred of Jews, commands a following of 9. 4 million. The kingdom is also patrolled by a religious police force that enforces the veil for women, prohibits young lovers from meeting and ensures that shops do not display “indecent” magazine covers. In the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, the religious police beat women with sticks if they stray into male-only areas, or if their dress is considered immodest by Salafi standards. This is not an Islam that the Prophet Muhammad would recognize.

Salafi intolerance has led to the destruction of Islamic heritage in Mecca and Medina. If ISIS is detonating shrines, it learned to do so from the precedent set in 1925 by the House of Saud with the Wahhabi-inspired demolition of 1,400-year-old tombs in the Jannat Al Baqi cemetery in Medina. In the last two years, violent Salafis have carried out similar sectarian vandalism, blowing up shrines from Libya to Pakistan, from Mali to Iraq. Fighters from Hezbollah have even entered Syria to protect holy sites.

Textbooks in Saudi Arabia’s schools and universities teach this brand of Islam. The University of Medina recruits students from around the world, trains them in the bigotry of Salafism and sends them to Muslim communities in places like the Balkans, Africa, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Egypt, where these Saudi-trained hard-liners work to eradicate the local, harmonious forms of Islam.

What is religious extremism but this aim to apply Shariah as state law? This is exactly what ISIS (Islamic State) is attempting do with its caliphate. Unless we challenge this un-Islamic, impractical and flawed concept of trying to govern by a rigid interpretation of Shariah, no amount of work by a United Nations agency can unravel Islamist terrorism.

Saudi Arabia created the monster that is Salafi terrorism. It cannot now outsource the slaying of this beast to the United Nations. It must address the theological and ideological roots of extremism at home, starting in Mecca and Medina. Reforming the home of Islam would be a giant step toward winning against extremism in this global battle of ideas.

Ed Husain is an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a senior adviser to the Tony Blair Faith Foundation.

Monday, August 25, 2014

A Saud view of Saud-sponsored ISIS, now possibly threatening the Two Mosques.


Al Arabiya (Arabic: العربية‎, transliterated: al-ʿArabiyyah or al-ʻArabīyah; the name means: "The Arabic One" or "The Arab One"[n 1]) is a Saudi-owned pan-Arab[3] television news channel broadcast in Modern Standard Arabic

On August 25, 2014, Al Arabiya publishes this article by Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist, columnist, author, and general manager of the upcoming Al Arab News Channel. The article presumably speaks in one of the several voices of  King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, Custodian of the Two Mosques, King of Saudi Arabis, and surely one of the richest individuals in the world, though most of his wealth is "state" owned. 

THE ARTICLE (Emphasis added)


How can we defeat ISIS if we don’t understand it? - Al Arabiya News 8/25/14 10:07 AM

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been digging its own grave, just as it has irrationally led many to their graves. It did not disappoint all those who followed its rise and predicted the inevitability of its end, as it carried the seeds of its own destruction within itself. . . .

The movement of takfirist jihadist salafism will lose again everything after it emerged and overcame all those who fell under its control, including the Sunnis.


Some  believers in takfirist jihadist salafism.

 We will witness the joy of Mosul, similar to when Kandahar celebrated the defeat of the Taliban in 2001. No one likes extremism.
- Al Arabiya News 8/25/14 10:07 AM

We cannot be optimistic about it yet. In the end, ISIS will fail, whether after long or short battles. Nevertheless, it will remain a dangerous terrorist movement that is secretly active on the same land where it was governing, just as its predecessor, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. However, its defeat will increase its violence and hatred. Its destructive idea won’t vanish as well because what has been established and prepared through decades and even spread beyond the limits to reach mosques in Europe and the whole world, cannot disappear in one year.
The world will militarily triumph over ISIS and its affiliates, but it needs to work hard in order to prevent the emergence of another generation of the organization.

Third generation

Today’s militants are the third generation of takfirist jihadist salafism. Its first generation emerged in the 1990s in Egypt and then in Algeria, where it intensified its activities. The second generation emerged after the 9-11 attacks, represented by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. As for now, we are witnessing the third generation with the rise of “caliphate” and ISIS.

However, one must admit that despite the impact of the war on terror and the media and intellectual campaigns against it, the takfirist jihadist salafism hatching machine is still productive and active. Even more, ISIS’ recent victories in Mosul and beyond stimulated it, attracting rebels and garnering a new generation of fighters.

The world needs a shock to act and put an end to ISIS’ victories at least, which has attracted more extremists. During the past month, ISIS witnessed a record rate of enrollment, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The Observatory estimated that more than 6,000 new fighters in Syria joined ISIS last month.

The real shock began when ISIS began to target religious minorities, and very shortly after that, beheaded American journalist James Foley. These acts have pushed the United States to act against them through limited bombing operations that helped the Kurdish fighters in their battle against ISIS over Iraq’s largest dam near Mosul last week.

‘Cooling’ recess

This setback will certainly lead to a “cooling” recess for people sympathizing with the organization, and this will surely constitute an advantage in the long battle to eradicate the organization.
Why did the world fail to stop the expansion of ISIS? Saudi King Abdullah is angered by many; the scholars who failed to act and the world that was not enthusiastic about the idea of establishing an international center to combat terrorism under the auspices of the United Nations.
As a result, he gave the ambassador to Washington and the Saudi representative in the United Nations $100 million as a donation to the center, so that the world would act and get involved in the fight against terrorism.

U.S. President Barack Obama said recently that ISIS is a cancer that must be eradicated. French President Francois Hollande said that the world is passing through the most dangerous phase and called for an international conference to find ways to confront ISIS.

It is clear that a military confrontation has begun to prevent ISIS from gaining new territory, especially in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iraqi army has not regained confidence because of sectarian and political strife within itself, so they would not want to help a sectarian army obtain air forces. This may change if Prime Minister-designate Haider al- Abadi forms his government and succeeds in including eminent Sunnis in it. This means that we are facing a longAl Arabiya News war fueled through the people of the region, while Americans and Europeans select afterwards who to protect and support and who to leave behind. It is a priority for both groups now that ISIS loses the war.

Mental war

If the military war on the ground is difficult and complex, the mental war is more difficult. Let us imagine a meeting room with all those who are affected by the war on terrorism, such as the Saudis, Egyptians, Iranians, Emiratis, Qataris, Jordanians, Turks, Americans and Europeans, and even Israelis, being required to develop a plan to eradicate ISIS.

How would they agree when each one of them has his priorities, visions, and his own analysis of the causes of this phenomenon? Added to that, some are secretly dealing with the organization. To make things worse, there is mistrust and accusations being traded between them.
How can we eradicate the disease when we have not yet agreed on its causes? We all describe the disease as bloody, rebellious, terrorist, murderer, savage and external. We all believe that it should not exist in this 21st century but we did not agree yet on its roots. We do not know its genetic DNA and we did not even agree on a name or definition. It attacked us under many names; sometimes as al-Qaeda, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria, and today under the name of ISIS, Ansar al-Sharia, Boko Haram, al-Shaabab and the Taliban. Do all of the above constitute one group or are they different movements that resort to the use of violence, murder and atonement?
Each one of them has qualities, history and causes that distinguish them from each other. Where is the truth and who knows it? How can we defeat something if we do not know what it is?
______________
Jamal Khashoggi is a Saudi journalist, columnist, author, and general manager of the upcoming Al Arab News Channel. He previously served as a media aide to Prince Turki al Faisal while he was Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States. Khashoggi has written for various daily and weekly Arab newspapers, including Asharq al-Awsat, al-Majalla and al-Hayat, and was editor-in-chief of the Saudi-based al-Watan. He was a foreign correspondent in Afghanistan, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan, and other Middle Eastern countries. He is also a political commentator for Saudi-based and international news channels.

A list, from the article, some look intriguing.

A familiar face can strengthen Saudi-Iranian ties
Camelia Entekhabi-Fard
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/2014/08/25/How-can-we-defeat-ISIS-if-we-don-t-understand-it-.html Page 3 of 5
How can we defeat ISIS if we don’t understand it? - Al Arabiya News 8/25/14 10:07 AM
From 9/11 to Foley’s murder, extremism lives on
Abdulrahman al-Rashed
Egyptian politics and the definition of insanity
H.A. Hellyer
Is it time for air strikes on ISIS in Syria?
Dr. Theodore Karasik
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How can we defeat ISIS if we don’t understand it? - Al Arabiya News 8/25/14 10:07 AM
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/2014/08/25/How-can-we-defeat-ISIS-if-we-don-t-understand-it-.html Page 5 of 5

ISIS and Turkey, form Al Monitor's point of view

ISIS is now "a terrorist organization" with no ideology, unworthy of anything but death.

Or so it seems to seem to America's government.

I became interested in how ISIS seems to Turkey, Russia, the Syrian ethnic and religious groups, the Sunni majority in Syria who want only to do business, all of whom have an interest in its destruction.  

I'm also interested in how other international players such as the Gulf Kingdoms individually, Britain, France, Germany, and China see ISIS.

Al info comes from the web, so my information is necessarily partial, even before it is run through the censorship of my own biasses.


The  article following may accurately represent Turkey's position.  I'll look further.

I was astonished to read that powerful Turkish newspapers proclaim that ISIS is an instrument of American power, created and sustained by the US, to harm Turkey.

READ ON:

Turkey PulseTÜRKİYE'NİN NABZI

Fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) celebrate on vehicles taken from Iraqi security forces on a street in Mosul, June 12, 2014. (photo by REUTERS)

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/akyol-isis-turks-iraq-syria-al-qaeda-mosul-consulate-cia.html##ixzz3BQsbmpM8

Three reasons why Turkey misunderstands ISIS

When the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) captured Mosul on June 10, kidnapping more than 80 Turks, Turkey woke up. The militant jihadist group, which was hardly a matter of concern in the media before this incident, became a national preoccupation. Despite this focus, however, there exists an ideological blind spot that, I believe, should be addressed to develop a more factual understanding of the world, in Turkey as well as beyond.

The blind spot is simply this: Many Turkish opinion leaders, especially those in the pro-government media, cannot accept ISIS, or its ilk, as extremist Islamist actors with genuinely held beliefs and self-defined goals. Rather they take it for granted that these terror groups are merely the pawns of a great game designed by none other than the Western powers. 
For example, Abdulkadir Selvi, a senior journalist who has been quite vocal in the press and on television generally espousing a pro-government stance, wrote a piece last week titled "Who is ISIS working for?" This was his answer: "Al-Qaeda was a useful instrument for the US. To put it in an analogy, ISIS was born from al-Qaeda's relationship with [the] CIA. The West gave its manners to al-Qaeda and now it designs our region through the hands of ISIS." In short, al-Qaeda and its offshoot ISIS are both creations of the US Central Intelligence Agency and serve American interests. 
Writing in the same pro-government daily, Yeni Şafak, the prominent columnist Yusuf Kaplan took a similar position. His culprit, however, was not the United States, but the United Kingdom. He wrote, "There is no such thing as ISIS. There is rather a heinous power called England … al-Qaeda was an instrument of the Americans, whereas ISIS is an instrument of the English." 
Yet another writer with strong pro-government views, Cemil Ertem, advanced a conspiratorial line in his column in the daily Star, but added a crucial element. ISIS, he argued, is "the product of the same center that also orchestrated Dec. 17" — referring to the day the corruption investigation, or "coup attempt," against the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan became public. Accordingly, that conspiratorial "center" first tried to topple Erdogan with a bogus corruption investigation, and when that failed, it reignited Kurdish tensions in the country and finally ordered ISIS to attack "Turkey's political and economic assets in Iraq." 
I quoted just three writers, but there are many similar examples. It would not be unfair to say that this conspiratorial understanding of ISIS is a powerful, if not dominant, narrative within Turkey's pro-government media. To be fair, there ismore fact-based analysis in the media. How much influence this conspiratorial thinking has on Turkey's decision makers is debatable. 
The first problem with these theories is that they are astonishingly Turkey-focused. To say that some hidden power center is using ISIS to hinder Erdogan's "New Turkey" is to ignore so many crucial facts and issues beyond the country's borders, such as the region's Sunni-Shiite tensions, the Salafi-jihadi ideology, the exclusion of the Sunnis by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government, the Baathists' contempt for Maliki, tribal divisons, lack of democratic cultures, inner dynamics of civil war, and so on. The fact is that although Turkey is indeed increasingly important in the region, the world does not revolve around it, and not everything that is problematic for Turkey is a carefully crafted plot against it.
The second problem, also relevant to the broader Muslim world, is the well-intentioned desire to draw a clear line between Islam and terrorism. This often results in declaring that groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS "have nothing to do with Islam," and this flows easily into the conspiracy theories: Since these groups have nothing to do with Islam, they must therefore be the creation of the CIA et al. as part of the effort to defame Islam and devise pretexts for Western colonial designs. 
The fact, however, is that violent jihadists have something to do with Islam in the same way that the crusaders or inquisitors had something to do with Christianity: They are violent fanatics of a major religion whose mainstream is peaceful. These fanatics will be rightfully dealt with not when they are dismissed as paid agents, but when they are understood, analyzed and challenged as genuine believers of a radical theology. 
A third problem is Turkey's state-centered political culture, in which there is no space for nonstate actors with their own goals and ambitions. That is why all such actors are explained away as mere puppets of states, especially the supposedly all-powerful Western states. 
None of this means, of course, that Western colonialism and interventionism are blameless for the current chaos in the Middle East. Britain, along with France, indeed planted the seeds of conflict a century ago, with their imperialist regional design in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Then, for decades, Western powers supported the dictators and juntas that served their interests. In 2003, the US-led invasion of Iraq, with Britain prominently taking part, toppled Saddam Hussein, but also acted as a "trigger for this savage violence," as Christopher Meyer, the British ambassador to the United States during the war, put it in a recent article. 
Most disastrous results of Western policy are indeed the unintended consequences, as is the case with most human actions. Moreover, the West is now genuinely alarmed about al-Qaeda, ISIS and similar extremist groups (among them Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabab in Somalia), not blissfully manipulating them to further new imperialist designs. In fact, there is hardly anything resembling a new design, but instead an increasingly chaotic and unpredictable world.
Today, Turkey, as a secular democracy and NATO member, should work with its Western allies to both protect itself and help end the bloodshed beyond its southern borders. Turkey's public intellectuals can assist with this (and other issues) only when they stop inventing ideologically driven conspiracy theories and focus on grasping and analyzing the complex facts of Turkey's complicated neighborhood.