United States should provide military aid to Syrian Kurds an Erdoğan be deamed

Erdogan Says US Arming Syrian Kurdish Militia

By Daren Butler and David Dolan

Posted 2016-09-23 17:28 GMT 

(Reuters) -- Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan accused the United States of supplying more weapons to Kurdish fighters in northern Syria this week, saying Washington had delivered two plane loads of arms to what Ankara considers a terrorist group.

Erdogan's comments are likely to add to the tension between Turkey and the United States over Syria, where Washington backs the Kurdish YPG forces against Islamic State. 

Turkey is part of the U.S.-led coalition against Islamic State but views the Syrian Kurdish YPG and its PYD political wing as an extension of Kurdish militants who have waged a three-decade insurgency on its own soil. 

"If you think you can finish off Daesh with the YPG and PYD, you cannot, because they are terrorist groups too," Erdogan said in comments in New York on Thursday that were broadcast on Turkish television. Daesh is an Arabic acronym for Islamic State. 

"Three days ago America dropped two plane loads of weapons in enthusiasm for these terror groups," he said, adding he had raised the issue on Wednesday with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden who he said had no knowledge of this. 

The United States, which sees the YPG as a major strategic partner in the fight against Islamic State in Syria, air-dropped weapons to the group in the largely Kurdish town of Kobani in 2014. Erdogan said that half of those arms were seized by Islamic State fighters. 

Kobani was besieged by Islamic State for four months in late 2014 and is about 35 km (20 miles) east of the Syrian border town of Jarablus, which Turkish-backed rebels seized a month ago in an operation dubbed "Euphrates Shield". 

That operation is designed to clear Islamic State fighters from Turkey's southern border area but it has also brought Turkish and Syrian rebel forces into conflict with the YPG. 

FOCUS ON ASSAD 

Much of Turkey's focus during the six-year Syria civil war has been on the need to oust Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rather than fighting Islamic State. Its recent push into northern Syria came after steady advances by the YPG.

Erdogan, who was on a visit to the United States this week, told broadcaster MSNBC that the blame for a deadly attack on a United Nations convoy rested squarely with Damascus. 

"The killer responsible for that attack is Assad's regime itself," he said, through a translator in an interview aired on Friday. 

He called again for the creation of a "safe zone" in northern Syria, an idea that has failed to gain traction with Western allies, who say it would require a significant ground force and planes to patrol. 

The top U.S. general on Thursday said the military was considering arming the Syrian Kurdish fighters, and acknowledged the difficulty of balancing such a move with the relationship with Ankara. 

"We are in deliberation about (what) exactly to do with the Syrian Democratic Forces right now," General Joseph Dunford told a Senate hearing, referring to a U.S.-backed coalition that includes the YPG. 

When asked whether he agreed that arming the Syrian Kurds fighters presented a military opportunity for the United States to be more effective in Syria, Dunford said: "I would agree with that. If we would reinforce the Syrian Democratic Forces' current capabilities that will increase the prospects of our success in Raqqa."

Raqqa is Islamic State's stronghold in Syria. 

Additional reporting by Susan Heavey in Washington and Tuvan Gumrucku in Ankara; Editing by Ralph Boulton.

Accord:  Times of Oman

__________

Here is  Raqqa, Syria

Koerden veroveren basis Islamitische Staat in noordelijk Syrië - NRC

The Battle for Raqqa in Syria and the coming battle for Mosel in Iraq are critical:  together they would amount to a defeat of the Islamic State.

From Turkey and Iraq's standpoint those victories would be major defeats in their campaigns against Kurds.

Turkey and Iraq have foolishly decided that the Kurds are their enemies.

The Kurds, who were promised an independent Kurdistan by the French, were assigned to Syria, Turkey, and Iraq, where they were treated abominably.  They are now poised to obtain partial freedom.  The jubilation is evident in the  enthusiasm with which they establish a free, multi-ethnic, non-sectarian, feminist state where no such state has ever existed in all of recorded history.

All freedom-loving peoples of the world should support them.

__________

Oman is ruled by a Greek philosopher-king, prescribed in Plato's Republic, as the ideal form of government.  Though a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Oman opposed the Saudi-United Arab Emirates' Yemen genocide on its helpless people, the only member of the council to refrai; and has done its best to end the genocide and bring peace to Syria.

Oman reminds me of Honolulu, if we were ruled by a philosopher-king, and if we had oil instead of tourists.

__________

Asyrans have lived in central Near East since the 25 Century BCE.  They have no empire now, and their great buildings and statues have been largely destroyed.  Per Wikipedia:

Islamic Terrorism (2003–present)

 

An Assyrian wedding in Mechelen, Belgium.

In recent years, particularly since 2014, the Assyrians in northern Iraq and north east Syria have become the target of unprovoked Islamic terrorism. As a result, Assyrians have taken up arms, alongside other groups (such as the Kurds, Turcomans and Armenians) in response to unprovoked attacks by Al Qaeda, ISIL, Nusra Front, and other Wahhabi terrorist Islamic fundamentalist groups. In 2014 Islamic terrorists of ISIS attacked Assyrian towns and villages in the Assyrian homelands of northern Iraq and north east Syria. Assyrians forced from their homes in cities such as Mosul have had their houses and possessions stolen, and given over to ISIS terrorists or Sunni Arabs.[67]

In addition, the Assyrians have suffered seeing their ancient indigenous heritage desecrated, in the form of Bronze Age and Iron Age monuments and archaeological sites, as well as numerous Assyrian churches and monasteries,[67] being systematically vandalised and destroyed by ISIS. These include the ruins of Nineveh, Kalhu (Nimrud, Assur, Dur-Sharrukin and Hatra).[68][69]

Assyrians in both northern Iraq, north east Syria and also central and southern Iraq[70][71][72] have responded by forming armed Assyrian militias to defend their territories,[73] and despite being heavily outnumbered and outgunned have had success in driving ISIS from Assyrian towns and villages, and defending others from attack.[74][75] Armed Assyrian militias have also joined forces with other peoples persecuted by ISIS and Sunni Muslim extremists, including; the Kurds, Turcoman, Yezidis, Syriac-Aramean Christians, Shabaks, Armenian Christians, Kawilya, Mandeans, Circassians and Shia Muslim Arabs and Iranians.

Wahhabi have much to answer for.

Turkey, Kurds, Ferguson, and the West's Conundrum

A House Foreign Affairs Committee bill would provide giving Iraqi Kurdistan, directly, anti-tank and anti-armor weapons, armored vehicles, long-range artillery, crew-served weapons and ammunition, secure command and communications equipment, body armor, helmets, logistics equipment, excess defense articles and other military assistance that the President determines to be appropriate.   In fact, whatever Turkey's Kurds need to establish an autonomous Kurdistan in Turkey.

A Senate bill co-sponsored by  some Democrats and by Republican presidential candidates Rand Paul (Ky.), Marco Rubio (Fla.). Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) provides for directly arming to the Kurds, rather than arming them through Bagdad.


President Obama objects.  The stated basis of  the objection is that arming Kurds directly would further weaken the Shiite-controlled national Iraqi government in Bagdad.

An unstated but more compelling objection is that it would trouble a NATO partner, Turkey.  For background, see

Part 2: Opportunities and dangers in West Asia 

Kurds and Turkey are at war.

Turkey has good reason to fear arming Kurds.  Kurds are the best fighters around, and Turkey treated its Kurds abominably until it decided it wanted to join the European Union, which ha high standards of treating its peoples.  Now that desire is fading and Turkey is looking eastward, to the Turkic Union, and is again treating Kueds badly.


From the West's point of view, Kurds are the best fighters around against the Islamic State; [IS] and Kurds were the best allies the West had in the Bushco's Iraq War.  The West has good reason to arm the Kurds.

How to support the Kurds and Turkey and end IS at the same time?  Certainly not with bluster,as the Republicans propose, but cautiously, deliberately, and with careful diplomacy.  That approach doesn't make good sound bites; it does make good sense.

Here is some useful information about unrest in Turkey, more organized than in any other Western country, for now.  (Turkey is Western, though Islamic -- for now.)

December 15, 2015

Demonstrators remove security barriers during a protest against the curfew in the Sur district of the southeastern city of Diyarbakir, Turkey, Dec. 14, 2015. (photo by REUTERS/Sertac Kayar)

 Ocalan silent as Kurds' fight for self-rule rages on

The cobbled alleys of Diyarbakir’s ancient Sur district are filled with shell casings and shattered glass. Black-masked teenagers touting Kalashnikovs and hand grenades mill around sandbag fortifications.

“We will defend our neighborhood till the last drop of our blood, till the revolution in Kurdistan is complete,” one of the youths told an Al-Monitor correspondent in Sur. That was on Dec. 11, when the Turkish authorities briefly eased a curfew that was slapped on six neighborhoods in Sur almost two weeks ago, allowing trapped residents to flee with the few possessions they managed to grab. “We are caught in the war. What else can we do? All we pray for now is peace,” said Remziye Kaya, a mother of six, as she hurried away with a small electrical stove.

Peace seems an increasingly elusive goal ever since a two-year cease-fire between Turkey’s Islamist government and rebels of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) collapsed in the wake of a deadly suicide bomb attack carried out by the Islamic State (IS) in the town of Suruc. Some 33 peace activists, many of them Kurds, were killed.

The PKK has long claimed that Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has used IS to sabotage the Syrian Kurds’ experiment with self-rule in the steadily expanding band of territory they control along the Turkish border they call Rojava.

Conspiracy theories abound as to who reignited the 31-year conflict — the government or the PKK — and why. At this point it hardly matters; the war is swiftly escalating, and the Kurds have raised the stakes like never before.

In a clutch of towns and cities across Turkey’s mainly Kurdish southeast, armed youngsters loyal to Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned PKK leader, and calling themselves the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H), have seized control of entire streets and neighborhoods, erecting barriers and declaring autonomy. The spirit of rebellion has permeated Sur, where pro-PKK slogans and posters of the mustachioed Ocalan cover bullet-riddled walls. Several young fighters interviewed by Al-Monitor all said that they would end their revolt only if ordered to do so by Ocalan. But since April 6, the Turkish authorities have not allowed any of his regular visitors, including the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) lawmakers who used to carry messages from him, to meet with Ocalan in his island prison.

The resulting vacuum has been filled by Cemil Bayik, the hard-line PKK commander who says he supports the YDG-H’s moves.

“This is a first, and the unrest could spread to the rest of the country,” warned Ahmet Sumbul, the managing editor of Mucadele, an independent local daily. “Don’t forget there are 5 million Kurds in Istanbul alone and most are young, unemployed and alienated, too,” he told Al-Monitor. Many are the children of the 1.5 million or so Kurds who were forced to flee their villages in the 1990s as a result of the scorched-earth campaign against the Kurds.

Martin van Bruinessen, a respected Dutch scholar and the author of several groundbreaking books on the Kurds, noted in an interview with Al-Monitor, “A few years ago, they were throwing stones at the police; now, a few years older, they carry firearms.” Local sources told Al-Monitor that these weapons are mostly being funneled by the PKK. The YDG-H “don't seem to be particularly afraid of being killed. The current level of state violence is likely to radicalize them even further. Unless the state is willing to kill large numbers of them, this is a war the state cannot win. And it will not be easy to stop the escalation,” van Bruinessen added.

While few believe that the YDG-H can hold the areas under its control indefinitely, its actions are piling pressure on the AKP, which became the first Turkish government to openly negotiate with the PKK and Ocalan. But the government’s refusal to grant the Kurds' demands for political autonomy enshrined in a brand-new constitution lies at the heart of the current deadlock.

Arzu Yilmaz, an Ankara-based academic who studies the Kurds, told Al-Monitor, “The Kurds want to be formally acknowledged as self-governing equal partners and for this new arrangement to be constitutionally guaranteed.”

Her views are widely echoed by PKK commanders and the HDP alike. Hishyar Ozsoy, an HDP lawmaker from Bingol, whose great grandfather, the legendary Sheikh Said, led one of the earliest Kurdish rebellions in 1925, said in an interview with Al-Monitor, “This is not about human rights. This is about collective rights, and nothing short of self-rule will satisfy the Kurds.”

“But the government is stuffing its ears,” he added.

To be sure, the government is growing more hawkish by the day. Round-the-clock curfews are being repeatedly imposed over traditionally restive towns like Silvan, Nusaybin and Cizre.

Some 22 mayors from the pro-Kurdish HDP have been locked up on thinly supported terrorism charges. “Special” police and military teams backed by tanks and armored personnel carriers have laid siege to the “liberated” zones and engaged in bloody street battles in a bid to flush and starve the youths out. They seem to be switching tactics.

“When the state temporarily lifts the curfews, it’s so that civilians can leave,” explained Gultan Kisanak, the fiery co-mayor of Diyarbakir in an interview with Al-Monitor. “The immediate purpose is to have a free hand to crush the youths. The larger goal is to scatter the Kurds, just as they did in the ’90s.”

Her reasoning may well be true and is repeated in public by fellow HDP officials. This in turn places huge moral pressure on ordinary Kurds caught in the crossfire to risk their lives and stay.

“The breakdown of the peace process and willingness of the Turkish government and PKK to bring war to the cities is taking a terrible toll on the Kurdish population,” said Emma Sinclair-Webb, a senior Turkey researcher for Human Rights Watch. “Credible allegations of police ill-treatment are on the rise. The enormous hardships people face under curfews with armed clashes raging — no water, no electricity, no food, no schooling, no medical treatment — mean that people are being driven out of the affected neighborhoods,” she noted in an email exchange with Al-Monitor.

Figures vary, but at least 150 people are said to have died since the violence flared in June. Muharrem Erbey, a respected human rights lawyer and member of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Regions Party, an HDP affiliate, believes that the security forces are responsible for most of the deaths. Reports of torture under police detention are also on the rise. “One of my clients had a truncheon repeatedly jammed up against his anus in a police van. He can barely walk,” Erbey told Al-Monitor in an interview.

The government may be calculating that the endless self-sacrifice being demanded of ordinary Kurds will turn them against the PKK. Meanwhile, Turkey’s Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu declared that the security forces would go “door to door” to root the “terrorists” out.

In Sur alone, thousands of businesses have been shut down. “Sur is the commercial heart not only of Diyarbakir but of the entire southeast,” said Shah Ismail Bedirhanoglu, who presides over the Southeastern Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association. He told Al-Monitor, “We are ruined, but it is poor people who are paying the highest price.”

Some HDP officials agree that popular anger is rising. “If there were an election today, the HDP would not make it into the parliament,” Imam Tascier, an HDP lawmaker from Diyarbakir, told Al-Monitor. Yet Tascier insists that the government is to blame for the current impasse, and like the youths in Sur, he believes Ocalan needs to be brought out of his isolation. Bedirhanoglu agrees.

“Ocalan’s silence is sowing confusion in the minds of the HDP and the PKK,” he said. “Above all, the Turkish state has to recognize the Kurds' demands for self-rule. The alternative, Allah forbid, is an all-out civil war,” Bedirhanoglu concluded.

Amberin Zaman

Columnist 

Amberin Zaman is an Istanbul-based writer who has covered Turkey for The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The Daily Telegraph and the Voice of America. A frequent commentator on Turkish television, she is currently Turkey correspondent for The Economist, a position she has retained since 1999. She is a columnist for Al-Monitor's Turkey Pulse. On Twitter: @amberinzaman

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Abdullah Öcalan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

❊    ❊    ❊

Abandoning his precapture policy, which involved violence targeting civilians as well as military personnel, Öcalan has advocated a relatively peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict inside the borders of Turkey.[55][56][57][58][59] Öcalan called for the foundation of a "Truth and Justice Commission" by Kurdish institutions in order to investigate war crimes committed by the PKK and Turkish security forces; a parallel structure began functioning in May 2006.[60] In March 2005, Abdullah Öcalan issued the Declaration of Democratic Confederalism in Kurdistan[61] calling for a border-free confederation between the Kurdish regions of Eastern Turkey (called "Northern Kurdistan" by Kurds[62]), East Syria ("Western Kurdistan"), Northern Iraq ("South Kurdistan"), and West of Iran ("East Kurdistan"). In this zone, three bodies of law would be implemented: EU law, Turkish/Syrian/Iraqi/Iranian law and Kurdish law. This perspective was included in the PKK programme following the "Refoundation Congress" in April 2005.[63]

Since his incarceration, Öcalan has significantly changed his ideology, reading Western social theorists such as Murray Bookchin, Immanuel Wallerstein, Fernand Braudel,[64] fashioned his ideal society as "Democratic Confederalism" (drawing heavily on Bookchin's Communalism),[65] [see Part 2, Opportunities and Dangers in Wet Asia, supra] and refers to Friedrich Nietzsche as "a prophet".[66] He also wrote books[67] and articles[68] on the history of pre-capitalist Mesopotamia and Abrahamic religions.

Öcalan had his lawyer, Ibrahim Bilmez,[69] release a statement 28 September 2006, calling on the PKK to declare a ceasefire and seek peace with Turkey. Öcalan's statement said, "The PKK should not use weapons unless it is attacked with the aim of annihilation," and that it is "very important to build a democratic union between Turks and Kurds. With this process, the way to democratic dialogue will be also opened".[70] He made another such declaration in March 2013.

On 31 May 2010, however, Öcalan said he was abandoning an ongoing dialogue between him and Turkey saying that "this process is no longer meaningful or useful". Turkey ignored his three protocols for negotiation that included (a) his terms of health and security (b) his release and (c) a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Though the Turkish government received these protocols, they were never published. Öcalan stated that he would leave the top PKK commanders in charge of the conflict. However, he also said that his comments should not be misinterpreted as a call for the PKK to intensify its armed conflict with the Turkish state.[71][72]

More recently, Öcalan has shown renewed cooperation with the Turkish government and hope for a peaceful resolution to three decades of conflict. On 21 March 2013, Öcalan declared a ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish state. Öcalan's statement was read to hundreds of thousands of Kurds gathered to celebrate the Kurdish New Year and it states, "Let guns be silenced and politics dominate... a new door is being opened from the process of armed conflict to democratization and democratic politics. It's not the end. It's the start of a new era." Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan welcomed the statement and hope for a peaceful settlement has been raised on both sides.

Soon after Öcalan's declaration was read, the functional head of the PKK, Murat Karayılan responded by promising to implement the ceasefire, stating, "Everyone should know the PKK is as ready for peace as it is for war".

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Recent images of Kurdish unrest in Western Turkey:

Kurdish leader calls for 'honourable resistance' after Turkish forces kill 55 http://ow.ly/W5akZ

A picture made avaliable 18 August 2015, Members of Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H) youth organization of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), guard in Silvan district, near city of Diyarbakir, Turkey, 17 August 2015. EPA/STR

After killing of Diyarbakır Bar President Tahir Elçi, curfew has been declared second time in Turkey’s southeastern Sur district of Diyarbakır province

Clashes have erupted in Turkey’s southeastern Diyarbakır province after police refused to permit a rally protesting an ongoing curfew. Two people were killed and two others were wounded in the violence

Demonstrators gesture during a protest against the curfew in Sur district in the southeastern city of Diyarbakır on Dec. 14

Walled city of Sur, Turkey

turkey-august-27th-2015-turkey-istanbul-members-of-the-patriotic-revolutionary-F160DR

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       Oh the folks will rise 

With the sleep still in their eyes

And they’ll jerk from their beds and think they’re’
But they’ll pinch themselves and squeal
And know that it’s for real
The hour when the ship comes in 

Then they’ll raise their hands
Sayin’ we’ll meet all your demands
But we’ll shout from the bow your days are numbered
And like Pharoah’s tribe
They’ll be drownded in the tide
And like Goliath, they’ll be conquered

                                        Bob Dylan, in an early incarnation, when he still trusted the people . . . .

Kurdistan, the Turks, and Bagdad

A recent interview with Masrour Barzani, son of the president of Kurdistan.

Here are highlights from the interviews:

We think all the parties should have a fair opportunity to participate and to work in [Syrian Kurdistan]. In any event, fighting IS doesn’t meant that there would immediately be an independent Kurdistan.

This comment must be unsettling to Ankara, which doesn't ever want an independent Kurdistan in Syria.

Al-Monitor:  Don’t you want independence for Iraqi Kurdistan?

Barzani:  I don’t think Iraq is a feasible project. It's time for the world to realize that the failed system needs to be reviewed. Repeating the same mistake and believing it will give you a different result is insanity. This is exactly true for Iraq. How many times have we tried to support a united, strong central government in Baghdad? It didn’t work. Kurdistan is controlled by the Kurds, the Sunni areas are controlled by [IS] and the Shiite areas are controlled by Shiite forces and the Popular Mobilization Units. Prime Minister [Haider al-] Abadi has been making a big effort to fix things. But the Iraqi government must accept this reality and look for other solutions. We are not pushing for forced separation. We are talking about an amicable divorce.

Al-Monitor:  And what do you do about Kirkuk?

Barzani:  If the Baghdad government is so confident that Kirkuk is part of Iraq, why have they still not implemented Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution? It explicitly states that a referendum needs to be held on the status of Kirkuk. But the referendum is always postponed. Why?

Why indeed.  Kirkuk should and will go to Kurdistan, by force of arms if need be.

Vice-president Biden predicted the need to divide Iraq at the beginning of Bushco's awful experiment in power politics.  We'd do well to make Biden our next president.

Masrour Barzani, chancellor of the Kurdistan Region Security Council [and son of Massoud Barzani,the president of the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq], speaks during a news conference, Oct. 12, 2013. (photo by Safin Hamed/AFP/Getty Images)

Masrour Barzani: Kurdish independence would help defeat IS

The war against the Islamic State (IS) is continuing full force in Iraq and Syria. And Kurds from both countries remain the most effective partners in the US-led coalition’s effort to eradicate the jihadists. But traditional rivalries between the main Iraqi Kurdish factions and tensions between Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish forces on the ground are hindering this effort. Turkey’s reluctance to open the Incirlik air base to combat missions against IS is another obstacle.


Al-Monitor spoke with Masrour Barzani, who heads the intelligence services of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), about the challenges facing the anti-IS coalition. Barzani, whose official title is chancellor of the Kurdistan Region Security Council, is the eldest son of Massoud Barzani, the KRG president and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Western diplomats say he is very much like his father — not fond of ostentation, firm in his convictions and reserved. The interview took place in the heavily guarded presidential compound that lies north of the KRG capital, Erbil.

The highlights of the interview follow:

Al-Monitor:  How is the war against IS going?

Barzani:  We have had ups and downs. [IS] was stopped from advancing and was defeated on several fronts. We liberated a vast area, mostly to the west of the Tigris River, including Rabiya and Zumar. Territories to the south of Erbil near Makhmour and Qwer and to the west and the southwest of Kirkuk between Erbil and Kirkuk were also liberated. We also took Jalawla, Saadiya and Khanaquin. So altogether about 20,000 square kilometers [7,722 square miles]. Unfortunately, we have lost about 1,280 peshmerga fighters since last August [when IS targeted Erbil]. About 7,000 peshmerga fighters have been wounded. But [IS] also suffered a lot with about 11,000 killed both on the ground by our forces and by coalition airstrikes. For a while we felt that [IS] was in decline. But the fall of Ramadi [in Iraq] and of Palmyra/Tedmur in Syria gave [IS] a huge boost both logistically and in terms of morale. This sent a clear message to the people in the areas under its control that “we are capable of reorganizing ourselves and launching attacks.” They are not all that easy to defeat.

Al-Monitor:  What more needs to be done?

Barzani:  I have no doubt that [IS] will be defeated. It’s a matter of time. Frankly no one other than the Kurds is doing enough.

Al-Monitor:  But the coalition’s support has proved vital.

Barzani:  Sure, everybody is contributing in one way or the other, but they are not acting quickly enough. We are still awaiting the training of new [anti-IS] forces by the coalition for Iraq and Syria. [IS] will use this time to recruit more people and more innocent lives will be lost.

So the question remains how determined is the international community to defeat [IS] as soon as possible.

Al-Monitor:  Turkey is often singled out as not being committed enough to the coalition, even though it is a coalition member. The fact that it is not allowing coalition aircraft to use the Incirlik air base is cited as an example. We know that your father in particular was very disappointed by Turkey’s failure to intervene when IS came within striking distance of Erbil last summer.

Barzani:  It is not my job to analyze the actions of governments and to tell the Turks what to do. But the facts are clear in terms of how every individual country is dealing with this particular issue. We have higher expectations from Turkey.

They should be doing a lot more than they are doing now. They are members of NATO, so they have to work out a system with the rest of the coalition members of how Turkey can best contribute. We are concerned by the deteriorating situation in Syria but also by the deterioration in the Kurdish peace process in Turkey. What we would love to see happen is for [IS] to be defeated and for the peace process to be expedited so that we can once and for all solve this problem of the Turks and Kurds inside Turkey.

Al-Monitor:  But recent statements by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Turkish government suggest that their position is hardening. Erdogan has said he will not tolerate the establishment of a Kurdish state on Turkey’s borders. And pro-government newspapers have described the YPG [People's Protection Units] as being a greater threat than even IS.

Barzani:  I think that the Turks should be more concerned about having [IS] on the borders of Turkey. Indeed, Turkish reaction to this should be one of relief that Kurds, as friends of the Turks, are controlling the border rather than [IS], which is the enemy of the entire world.

Now when I say Kurds, I don't particularly mean the YPG. I am talking about many other Kurdish forces, other political parties [such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria (KDP-S)] that are moderate. Even if Turkey has concerns about a particular group [YPG] I think they should be helping to build up a coalition of all moderate forces. And the Americans are trying to encourage this [cooperation between the YPG and the KDP-S] because it’s the only way forward. We think all the parties should have a fair opportunity to participate and to work in [Syrian Kurdistan]. In any event, fighting IS doesn’t meant that there would immediately be an independent Kurdistan.

Al-Monitor:  Don’t you want independence for Iraqi Kurdistan?

Barzani:  I don’t think Iraq is a feasible project. It's time for the world to realize that the failed system needs to be reviewed. Repeating the same mistake and believing it will give you a different result is insanity. This is exactly true for Iraq. How many times have we tried to support a united, strong central government in Baghdad? It didn’t work. Kurdistan is controlled by the Kurds, the Sunni areas are controlled by [IS] and the Shiite areas are controlled by Shiite forces and the Popular Mobilization Units. Prime Minister [Haider al-] Abadi has been making a big effort to fix things. But the Iraqi government must accept this reality and look for other solutions. We are not pushing for forced separation. We are talking about an amicable divorce.

Al-Monitor:  And what do you do about Kirkuk?

Barzani:  If the Baghdad government is so confident that Kirkuk is part of Iraq, why have they still not implemented Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution? It explicitly states that a referendum needs to be held on the status of Kirkuk. But the referendum is always postponed. Why?

Al-Monitor:  You say IS controls the Arab Sunni areas along the KRG’s borders. How do you get IS to accept your independence?

Barzani:  [IS] is not a part of any dialogue. [IS] must be defeated.

Al-Monitor:  Are you saying you need to defeat [IS] before you declare independence?

Barzani:  No, we are not saying that because we don’t know for how long [IS] is going to be around. Our priority is to fight [IS], but finishing [IS] doesn’t mean that terrorism will end. There will be many other forms.

Al-Monitor:  Would you be more effective fighting them if you were independent?

Barzani:  Yes.

Al-Monitor:  Could you explain?

Barzani:  We would be able to make our own agreements to purchase our own weapons in quantity, quality and on time. Whereas now unfortunately we are still experiencing difficulties getting the weapons that we need and getting them in the quantity and at the time that we need them.

Al-Monitor:  Would a US base to protect you help?

Barzani:  Whenever Kurdistan becomes independent I can give you an answer.

Al-Monitor:  Could you imagine a scenario where the Kurdish areas of Syria become part of an independent Kurdistan of which the capital would be Erbil?

Barzani:  I don’t know. I don’t want to engage in speculation. Our intention in Iraqi Kurdistan is to focus on Iraqi Kurdistan, which has a legitimate, recognized administration and territories. And we wish to have friendly relations based on mutual respect with all of our neighbors.

Al-Monitor:  Turkey has offered to mediate between the KDP and the YPG/PKK [Kurdistan Workers Party] over Sinjar. The tensions between your forces and the YPG-PKK that played a significant part in the liberation of Sinjar are well known. You want the YPG to leave Sinjar and they are resisting?

Barzani:  The Turks wanted to play a role and it came a little late because when the Kurds came under attack from [IS] the expectation was that Turkey would play a much bigger role by actively engaging and providing the support that the Kurds needed. Sinjar is a completely different story. Sinjar is deep inside our territories. The problem there [the IS occupation] was solved with the help of coalition airstrikes but primarily by the peshmerga forces. Sinjar is a Kurdish territory inside Iraq and the PYD [the YPG’s political arm] is a guest exactly in the same way that our peshmerga forces were when they went to support them in Kobani, but then returned. It is the expectation of the people of Iraqi Kurdistan that foreign fighters eventually leave and go back to where they came from.

Al-Monitor:  Isn’t the greatest expectation among Kurds everywhere that you rise above your differences and unite? I have heard many say that an army uniting all the different Kurdish groups should be formed?

Barzani:  We are uniting already against [IS]. There are Kurds from Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. As for a united Kurdish army of all these different groups, you have to understand the reality on the ground. It’s probably premature to think that such a thing would happen, especially given Iraqi Kurdistan’s own unique situation. It would be best for Kurds from other parts to help the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Al-Monitor:  How would that translate in Sinjar?

Barzani:  Like I said, the PKK has no role to play. They should pull out and they must because the people of Sinjar will determine their own future and this is Iraqi Kurdistan. Would the PKK be happy if a Kurdish political party inside Iraq meddled in the affairs of Diyarbakir or Mardin? But there are parties inside the Kurdish community within Turkey that definitely should be allowed to play a role. We believe in a multiparty system. PYD-PKK elements must pull out when the situation gets back to normal.

Al-Monitor:  What of the PKK presence in the Qandil Mountains?

Barzani:  This is Iraqi territory and they must leave. And this is one of the reasons why we are so eager to see the Kurdish peace process inside Turkey succeed. We hope this problem will be resolved peacefully.

Al-Monitor:  How concerned are you about growing Iranian influence and the Popular Mobilization Units?

Barzani:  We respect the achievements of the Popular Mobilization Units but their status needs to be clarified. They need to come under legal supervision and be fully answerable to the Iraqi authorities, and rather than compete they ought to complement each other. In any case, under the Iraqi Constitution our territory is protected and controlled by our own forces so there is no need for others to come in. And as I said, we would like to have friendly relations with all of our neighbors including Iran, and that our relationship is based on mutual respect.

They cannot look down on us as subordinate or inferior.

Al-Monitor:  Do they?

Barzani:  In some areas they do, but definitely not in Kurdistan. Kurdistan is different.

Al-Monitor:  But Iran has intervened in the internal matters of Iraqi Kurdistan before, as it did in the 1990s when it helped the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan recapture Sulaimaniyah from the KDP.

Barzani:  There are definitely differences between parties. There are dependencies on third parties. Our goal and the goal of our president was to create a prosperous, democratic Kurdistan region that would respect its neighbors. We understand there are pressures on Kurdistan from its neighbors, but in the end it's up to the Kurds to realize that unity is really the guarantee to their success.

Al-Monitor:  The president’s term is due to expire in August and there are differences between the KDP and the opposition over whether his term ought to be extended for a third time. Moreover, the opposition insists that the powers of the president [Massoud Barzani] be curbed. This is surely a test of your unity.

Barzani:  I think the president has become a symbol of the Kurdish national movement, whether some accept it or not. Under normal circumstance we would have had elections on Aug. 20 and the president has asked the parliament and the electoral commission to prepare for elections. It’s now up to the commission to arrange for elections to be held on time, and if not to avert a legal vacuum. Before this issue arose all the political parties agreed that all matters pertaining to the national interest must be solved through consensus. If these parties understand the threat posed by [IS] and the economic problems we are having because of revenue-sharing with Baghdad, they would realize that the last thing Kurdistan needs is another crisis. Consensus is the best way forward.

When the KDP had the majority of seats and the power to make decisions, they always encouraged a consensus and national unity. Sadly, when the KDP’s rivals feel there is a single opportunity to bring down the KDP, they forget the national interest and they immediately jump on what is in it for them as a political gain. It’s a cheap game.



Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/turkey-iraq-syria-kurdish-independence-help-war-against-isis.html#ixzz3exMSHw5E

Why Turkey matters, to Turks, and therefore to us.

If you  spend some time reading the news article below you will have a tiny taste of the complexity the US is dealing with in Syria.

The importance to Turkey of  Tell Abyad isn't hard to understan.  It is as if the fighting and bloodshed were going on in Matomoros, just across the Mexican border.  We'd be interested, too.

 

John Donne, 1623, London, England

No man is an island, 

Entire of itself,

Every man is a piece of the continent, 

A part of the main. 

If a clod be washed away by the sea, 

Europe is the less. 

As well as if a promontory were.

As well as if a manor of thy friend's 

Or of thine own were:

Any man's death diminishes me,

Because I am involved in mankind. . . .

                   
If you read the article, ask yourself which of the Republican candidates for president have demonstrated an intellectual rigor capable of benefiting the United Syria, in the face of the complexities Syria offers.  And then consider Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and finally Yemen, our decision to supply the Saudis with cluster bombs that kill women, children, youngmen, non-combatants, mostly.

Ask yourself which candidate can be for an against the same folks at the same time and maintain a degree of civility with all.

I have my favorites among Republicans, which I'll keep to myself for now.  But remember:  the much hated Nixon opened China o the World.

 
TURKEY PULSE TÜRKİYE'NİN NABZI

ighters from the Kurdish People's Protection Units remove an Islamic State sticker in Tel Abyad town, Raqqa governorate, June 16, 2015.  (photo by REUTERS/Rodi Said)

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/turkey-syria-kurdish-corridor-in-the-making-kobane.html#ixzz3dvCTGysZ

Kurds eye new corridor to Mediterranean

When the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) expelled the Islamic State from Tell Abyad, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, other Justice and Development Party (AKP) leaders and the pro-government media reacted hysterically. Among their frenzied scenarios: “Kurdish state in the making in northern Syria with US assistance,” “Kurdish ethnic cleansing of Arabs and Turkmens,” “Corridor opening to move Northern Iraq oil to Mediterranean.” One about the Democratic Union Party went further: “PYD more dangerous than [IS].”

Summary⎙ Print The dream of a Kurdish corridor from Jazeera to Afrin appears to be attainable, but everything depends on the complicated relationships the Kurds are working to maintain in the area's complex ethnic and ideological makeup.

We are so engrossed with demonizing the defensive operations of the Kurdish movement in Rojava that we don’t even have time to discuss what the PYD and the YPG are actually doing. Never mind the crazed scenarios of setting up a Kurdish state or opening a corridor to the Mediterranean, there are two important questions to study:

After taking control of Tell Abyad and linking the Kobani and Jazeera cantons, will the YPG now cross to the western bank of the Euphrates River to expel IS from Jarablus?

If the Kurds eliminate IS from Jarablus, will they move westward to open a corridor from Azez to Afrin canton?

The YPG, which entered Tell Abyad with the support of the US Air Force and Arab fighters such as Burkan Al Firat, now controls a contiguous 180 km (110 mile) stretch from Ras al-Ain to Jarablus. Thus from the border of south Kurdistan to Euphrates at Jarablus, the YPG now controls 400 km (250 miles). Their next potential target, the line from Afrin to Jarablus, is 110 km (68 miles) long.

The area between Afrin and Jazeera is home to several different ethnic groups. In Jazeera canton, there are Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs, Chaldeans, Armenians and Chechens. Arabs make up 30% of the population. The Kobani and Afrin cantons are predominantly Kurdish. At Tell Abyad, the Kurds constitute 40-45% of the population. In Jarablus, Arabs and Turkmens are in the majority.

There is no doubt many Kurds dream of a fully fledged, united West Kurdistan from Jazeera to Afrin. But geographic and demographic realities do not lend themselves to the creation of their Rojava. Actually, the Kurdish actors are realists and have been wisely following a road map that incorporates the geographic, ethnic and religious diversity of the region. Kurds owe their recent gains in the region to their cooperation with other ethnic elements. If they deviate from this course, their alliance, particularly with the Arabs, could easily collapse,

The basic motivation of the Kurds was to eliminate the IS threat and secure Afrin as they did Kobani. Control of Afrin had passed from the Damascus regime to the PYD-led Kurdish movement on July 11, 2012. On June 7, 2013, the Kurds took control of Kurdish villages in Afrin's vicinity from the opposition forces and opened up a corridor to Tel Rifat in the east. Afrin’s population of about 700,000 doubled with the Kurds fleeing clashes around Aleppo. Reinforcing the Kurdish defense became problematic then, because IS was deployed on both flanks of Kobani. Afrin, which is surrounded by Arab and Turkmen, is now under siege by the Islamic Front and Jabhat al-Nusra.

According to Idris Nassan, Kobani's deputy minister of foreign relations, there are four conditions that must be met for the YPG to cross to the western bank of the Euphrates: Cooperation with opposition forces in the area, the request of the local tribes, a viable threat against Afrin and the continuation of the support by the international coalition.

To Al-Monitor’s query of whether the YPG will cross the Euphrates, journalist Fehim Isik replied, “The Kurds never had plans to advance on the ground to occupy territory. From the outset they have adhered to a policy of security of their area and building a democratic, free structure with the other peoples sharing their area. To have Tell Abyad in IS hands was a serious threat to the Kurds' and regional security. That is why they went after Tell Abyad. It is possible to predict that YPG will now turn toward Jarablus to eliminate the IS control there. This has nothing to do with building an oil pipeline. It is to build a free and democratic life.”

Veysel Ayhan, the chairman of Middle East Peace Research Center, offered this assessment: “It is inevitable that the Kurdish movement together with the Arabs of the area will try to free the other bank of the Euphrates. If that is not done, the eastern bank of the Euphrates will not feel secure. The YPG had earlier said that ridding Raqqa of IS will be part of their plans. This is why the Kurdish movement is not just an element of defense but a key actor of freedom for the Syrian peoples. That is why opening a safe corridor to Afrin is vital to meet the basic needs and security of the people of the region.”

Uneasy partnership with Islamists

Although it is possible to shape a partnership with opposition forces against IS, the opening of a Kurdish corridor to Afrin won’t be easy. From Jarablus to Afrin, there is first IS and then Islamic Front domination. IS controls Bab, Menbic, Rai and Jarablus from Raqqa toward Turkey in the north. To the west between Aleppo and Turkey, Azez, Tel Rifat and Marea are controlled by Islamic Front factions. There is also Jabhat al-Nusra, which relies on Turkey and had earlier tried to enter Afrin from the south but couldn’t do it.

There are ideological barriers to the YPG setting up an alliance with the Islamic Front, as it did with Burkan Al Firat forces at Kobani and Tell Abyad. Islamic Front factions reject cooperating with the PYD and YPG because of their leftist ideology and perception as Kurdish militias of the Syrian regime. Turkmen organizations in harmony with Turkish policy brand the YPG as a terrorist extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party.

But fatal blows by IS could compel the Islamist Front to cooperate with the YPG. In recent weeks, IS hit at Islamic Front positions first to capture Soran before turning toward Marea. IS hopes to recoup the loss of Tell Abyad by capturing the Selame border crossing. But the Selame crossing is vital to the Aleppo districts areas under opposition control. The Islamic Front and its allies are in fully mobilized to confront IS' plans.

Although the Islamic Front might cooperate with the YPG against IS, the last thing the group wants is to share the region with Kurds. A cooperation of necessity may offer Kurds a safe corridor to reach Afrin, but this won’t mean a Kurdish belt or an area of Kurdish control.

Tribes support Islamic organizations

The attitudes of the tribes are as important as the positions of other organizations. Although The Kurdish Front operating at Azez is counted as an YPG ally, they have strong reservations about the YPG. Jarablus is predominantly Arab and Turkmen, with a minimal Kurdish presence. The tribes of Jarablus were divided between Jabhat al-Nusra, the Free Syrian Army and IS. When IS captured the town in January 2014, 80% of the population fled to Turkey. Bab and Menbic, controlled by IS are almost totally Arab. These two deeply conservative locations facilitate the operations of Islamist organizations without offering much opportunity to secularist forces like the YPG. Turkmen tribes scattered among about 150 villages at Azez, Bab, Menbic, Jarablus and the mountains also keep their distance from the YPG, even more so than the Arabs.

Syrian Kurdish sources speaking to Al-Monitor say that at the moment, the time for cooperation with Islamic Front factions for the far bank of the Euphrates is not ripe.

The YPG may be forced to cross the Euphrates if Afrin comes under attack. But for IS to capture Afrin, it must first remove the Islamic Front from Marea and Tel Rifat. The threat to Afrin comes not only from the IS. Other Islamist organizations from time to time lay siege on Afrin when they have problems with the YPG.

For the YPG to move against Jarablus, it badly needs the continuation of US air support. The partnership with the United States that started at Kobani has reached to new levels at Tell Abyad. According to a US official who spoke to daily Hurriyet’s Tolga Tanis, the United States, beyond giving close air support to the YPG, is also assisting with the removal of booby traps and mines by a civilian contractor.

The United States has not been able to achieve the level of cooperation it has secured with the Kurds with other opposition forces. Keeping in mind Turkey’s vehement protests, it is not yet clear whether the United States intends to expand its operations in the region.

The YPG's route to Afrin also depends on the fate of the Arabs and Turkmens of Tell Abyad. If a civilian and security structure that will satisfy the Arabs and Turkmens of Tell Abyad cannot be provided, the plans for Jarablus and more could be in jeopardy.

The Kurds don’t want a Kurdish-Arab or Kurdish-Turkmen confrontation on the way to Afrin. There are no indications of a Kurdish desire to take over the region against the wishes of Arabs and Turkmens. But possibilities such as ethnic cleansing could trigger a Kurdish-Arab confrontation, which in turn could motivate the Arab tribes of Jazeera to cooperate with the regime or other armed groups. This is why Kurds are not expected to take any steps that may threaten all the gains they have made with the other peoples of the area since 2012.



Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/turkey-syria-kurdish-corridor-in-the-making-kobane.html#ixzz3dv8p6yZo

Iran Greens in some power positions

Information about Iran is hard to come by.  This article reports that at least parts of the Green Revolution are not only free but in power positions in Iran.  If true it is good news indeed.

Russia joins Iran in support for Assad, and the US has moderated its insistence that Assad must go before a new government is formed.  Islamists have been he main problem in Syria from the beginning, and they have and continue to have support from the Gulf Dictatorships.

Should Russia be encouraged to arm Kurds in the North of Iraq?  (The US fears doing so out of respect for Turkey).  The news reports don't mention any substantial Russian opposition to ISIS in Syria.  Russia's arming Kurds might bolster its control over restive Russian provinces in Russia's South.

Russia should give up its Ukraine adventure, and concentrate on ISIS, its actual enemy.  The US should freely encourage Russia in doing so, and the likes of Miss Lindsay Graham be damned!

June 4, 2015

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (R) holds a press conference with his Syrian counterpart, Walid Moallem, in Tehran, Dec. 8, 2014. (photo by ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images)

Why did Iran's Reformists shift on support for Syria?

Ali Akbar Velayati, a top aid to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, visited Syria to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on May 19 and announce once again his country’s support of Assad. The visit came only a few weeks after Syria’s defense minister, Fahd Jassem al-Freij, visited Tehran on April 28 to meet with Iranian officials. In another development, two Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) generals were killed in Syria in a military operation against anti-Assad fighters on May 20. In Iran, killed IRGC generals are highly respected and hailed as patriot heroes who fought against the Islamic State (IS) and sacrificed their lives in defense of their country and the holy shrines of the Shiite faith. After a long period of controversy and disagreement about foreign policy issues between Reformists and conservatives, there appears to be a consensus on national security.

Many Reformists in Iran initially welcomed the protests against Assad. Between Aug. 5, 2011, and Oct. 18, 2012, the Coordination Council for the Green Path of Hope, one of Iran’s main Green Movement groups, issued a series of statements lending fundamental support to the uprising of the “oppressed people of Syria,” comparing their protests to the Iranian Green Movement protests and suggesting that freedom-seekers throughout the world should learn from each other. In September 2011, 150 Iranian physicians wrote a letter to Assad, condemning “the massacre of defenseless Syrian people.” Leading Reformists such as Mostafa Moeen, Mohammad Reza Khatami and Ali Shakouri-Rad were among those who signed the letter.

Since March, the Reformists’ stance on Syria and Iraq has transformed so dramatically that a leading Reformist-minded journalist outside of the country, Masoud Behnoud, described with admiration Qasem Soleimani — the head of the Quds Force of the IRGC who runs Iran’s regional policies — with such unusual words as the Saint General, likening him to legendary Iranian military Cmdr. Mostafa Chamran. In April, Abbas Abdi, an acclaimed Reformist politician, criticized his fellow Reformists’ previous views on Syria more blatantly and accused them of siding with Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

But the question remains how such a significant shift took place, bringing Reformists so close to their conservative rivals on foreign policy.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s success in the 2013 presidential election, the disappointing aftermath of the Libyan and Egyptian revolutions and the surge of IS in Syria and Iraq led Reformists to revise their attitude toward Syria. The Syrian uprising commenced when the Iranian Green Movement was undergoing its second year in 2011; as a result, Iranian Reformists compared Syria with Iran, correspondingly condemning Assad and hailing the rebels. Iranian Reformists felt that they sought the same democratic goals as peacefully as Syrians and that they were oppressed in the same way by the Iranian government as Assad oppressed his people. Therefore, they felt sympathy with Syrian rebels fighting Assad. But with the success of Rouhani in the June 2013 presidential election, they were no longer opposition leaders outside of the power structure; instead, they became part of a ruling government that was required to define and shape the foreign policies of the state, taking into consideration broader issues of geopolitical significance such as the Iran-Saudi power balance. Iran’s Green Movement leaders and other figures remain under arrest and outside of power.

But the Syrian issue was redefined in a framework of broader geopolitical realities with immediate consequences on Iran’s regional influence, rather than only a source of sympathy or a comparison and victimization to be used in domestic political competitions.

Developments on the ground in Libya, Syria and Iraq, however, were also very relevant in that the whole Arab Spring, democracy and human rights discourse turned into a discourse of brutal jihadi terrorists fighting a secular (and previously stable) government. While at the outset, the strings of Arab revolutions were monitored optimistically and were models to be followed in other countries, eventually the chain of the events — especially in Libya and Syria — became so dreadful that desirability of any further revolution was questioned. With the shocking failure of the Libyan model, the idea of similar activities no longer had any appeal in Iran. Any call for radical reforms was responded to only by referring to Libya and Syria and their outcomes.

Another factor that led to the change of some Reformists’ views was the surge of IS in Syria and Iraq in May and June 2014, where the foreign policy of Reformists became even closer to that of the conservatives. The IS blitzkrieg takeover of Mosul alarmed many in Tehran and was considered a looming threat to the nation. Iran’s involvement in Syria, formerly considered by many Reformists as illegitimate support of a tyrant, was suddenly considered a nationalistic defensive action against an immediate and imminent threat. The IRGC’s earlier argument that “if we do not fight them in Damascus, we have to fight them back in the streets of Tehran” found more support. Therefore, Iran’s involvement in Syria and Iraq was hailed as an unavoidable pre-emptive and defensive war against IS brutalities rather than the support of Assad. Furthermore, it gave Iran legitimacy in its support of Assad internationally, as Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif emphasized in his interview with Spiegel: “If we had not provided that support, you would have had [IS] sitting in Damascus now.”

The relative unanimity in foreign policy among the main political blocs in Iran, however, was not totally due to the shift in Reformists’ views; rather, it was also because of conservatives’ change of view. Khamenei’s assertive policy change, demonstrated by his well-known phrase of "heroic flexibility," indicates conservatives’ move toward more congruity with Reformists. While for years Khamenei firmly resisted any overt negotiations with the United States, foreign ministers of the two countries have met several times during the last few months. Recently, Zarif clearly announced the willingness of his country to extend engagements with the United States “far beyond nuclear negotiations.” This followed Khamenei’s previous implicit confirmation a few days earlier.